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ABSTRACT 
This Article is a historical study of the Case of Josiah Philips. 
Philips led a gang of militant loyalists and escaped slaves in the Great 
Dismal Swamp of southeastern Virginia during the American Revolu-
tion. He was attainted of treason in 1778 by an act of the Virginia 
General Assembly, tried for robbery before a jury, convicted and exe-
cuted. For many years, the Philips case was thought to be an early 
example of judicial review, based on a claim by St. George Tucker that 
judges had refused to enforce the act of attainder. Modern research 
has cast serious doubt on Tucker’s claim. This Article draws on period 
sources to establish what we know about Philips’ activities and to ar-
gue for the case’s continuing importance. In particular, the Philips 
case is a rich illustration of wartime justice and the development of a 
doctrine of separation of powers. Edmund Randolph, Attorney Gen-
eral and then Governor of Virginia (and the first Attorney General of 
the United States), regarded Philips’ fate as evidence of the danger of 
a legislative power to summarily convict for treason. Another Vir-
ginia Governor, Patrick Henry, thought such a power essential in a 
legislature and argued that Philips had received his due as a bandit 
under principles of international law. It was this suggestion that may 
have led St. George Tucker to describe Virginia judges as refusing to 
enforce the act, since there were difficult legal questions about 
Philips’s status under international law. The Article explores these 
questions in some detail, and concludes by connecting them to 
broader changes in American understandings of legislative power and 
its relation to law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Josiah Philips was a bandit—a terrorist, we would say—who led a 
gang of militant loyalists and escaped slaves in the Great Dismal 
Swamp of Virginia during the American Revolution. In the summer 
of 1778, the Virginia General Assembly passed a bill attainting him of 
treason, drafted by none other than Thomas Jefferson.1  Traditionally, 
a “bill of attainder” condemned someone to death for a widely-known 
1. An act to attaint Josiah Philips and others, unless they render themselves to justice 
within a certain time, c.12, 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS 
OF  VIRGINIA, FROM THE  FIRST  SESSION OF THE  LEGISLATURE IN THE  YEAR 1619, at 463–64 
(William Waller Hening ed., 1821) [hereinafter VA STATUTES AT LARGE]; Bill to Attaint Josiah 
Philips and Others, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 189–90 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) 
[hereinafter Bill to Attaint]. 
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treason in conditions where courts of law were incapable of reaching 
the offender.2 Jefferson’s bill contained a grace period, and Philips 
was captured before it ended, sparing him an immediate death sen-
tence. Instead, he was indicted for robbery, tried before a jury, con-
victed and executed as a felon.3 
In the years that followed, the case took on an air of mystery. 
The men involved (and some uninvolved) made a series of baffling 
and contradictory claims about just what had happened to Philips. In 
the opening days of the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, where del-
egates debated a proposed federal Constitution, Edmund Randolph 
suggested that Philips had been executed pursuant to the act of attain-
der, despite the fact that Randolph himself had prosecuted Philips for 
robbery as the state’s attorney general.4 Patrick Henry conceded the 
claim, though he had been intimately involved in the Philips affair and 
must have known what had happened, and though his concession bol-
stered the case for ratifying a Constitution he bitterly opposed.5  Some 
years after that, the eminent Virginia jurist, St. George Tucker, stated 
in his annotated edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries that judges had 
refused to enforce the act of attainder, making the case one of the 
earliest instances of what we now call “judicial review.”6 But when, 
decades after that, Thomas Jefferson learned of the claims of Tucker, 
Randolph, and Henry, he angrily denied them all, asserting that 
Philips had been captured after the grace period, and that then-Attor-
ney General Randolph had decided not to seek execution under the 
act.7  Judge Tucker, he wrote misreported the case in an effort to com-
pose a “diatribe” against bills of attainder.8 
A dread of wandering into this morass, and a sense that someone 
has irretrievably contaminated the record by, well, lying, has led the 
2. Matthew J. Steilen, Bills of Attainder, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 767, 890–94 (2016). Widely 
known crimes were said to be “notorious,” and their prosecution could proceed on the basis of 
what commentators call “manifest proofs.” JOHN M. COLLINS, MARTIAL  LAW AND  ENGLISH 
LAWS, C. 1500 – C. 1700, at 19, 21 (2016). 
3. Jesse Turner, A Phantom Precedent, 48 AM. L. REV. 321, 322–23 (1914). 
4. See infra Part II.A.  On Attorney General Randolph’s prosecution of Philips, see Trent, 
infra note 74, at 450–51. 
5. See infra note 74. 
6. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, 
TO THE  CONSTITUTION AND  LAWS, OF THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT OF THE  UNITED  STATES, 
AND OF THE  COMMONWEALTH OF  VIRGINIA 293 (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES]. 
7. See infra Part II.C. 
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Louis H. Girardin (Mar. 12, 1815), in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
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Case of Josiah Philips to lie dormant for some time.9  This is a mis-
take. It is a rich and important case.  It has much to tell us about the 
allocation of governmental authority during periods of armed conflict, 
or what we might call the “institutional structure” of conflict. Today 
the President and political leadership of the United States Armed 
Forces largely control the timing and terms of conflict, but this is usu-
ally thought to be an institutional structure that has emerged over 
time.10 Indeed, the Philips case reveals a very different structure at 
work, and the controversy that followed the case reveals a range of 
opinions, on the eve of ratification and in the first decades afterwards, 
about just how to separate governmental powers during war. 
Take these points one at a time. First, the Philips attainder illus-
trates how state legislatures and their committees exercised significant 
legal powers during the war, ordering arrests, mass removals, confisca-
tions and even executions pursuant to summary proceedings they con-
ducted. The bill of attainder was one such summary proceeding.11  Its 
use reflects the view of some in the founding generation that the as-
9. Most of the important historical work on the case is now over 100 years old. See H. J. 
ECKENRODE, THE REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 66, 191–92 (1916); W. P. Trent, The Case of Josiah 
Philips, 1 AM. HIST. REV. 444 (1896); Turner, supra note 3, at 323.  Hamilton Eckenrode was an 
archivist with the Virginia State Library and claimed to base his account on an examination of 
state records. I utilize Eckenrode’s history below.  Jesse Turner was a progressive historian, and 
his interest in the case grew from Judge Tucker’s suggestion that it had involved judicial review. 
Another treatment of the case by a progressive constitutional historian is CHARLES  GROVE 
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 77–80 (1959), but Haines’s work 
is essentially derivative.  The only recent studies of the Philips attainder are LEONARD W. LEVY, 
ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72–77 (1999); 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND 
THE  CONSTITUTION IN THE  HISTORY OF THE  UNITED  STATES 944, 945 (1953).  Both Crosskey 
and Levy have axes to grind, however, and this limits the usefulness of their work. Crosskey is 
consumed with winnowing the list of early state-court ‘precedents’ for judicial review, and rather 
liberal with his accusations of mendacity; Levy’s views are colored by a very palpable dislike of 
Jefferson.  The Bill of Attainder Clauses and the Philips case are also discussed in Jay Wexler’s 
light-hearted book, THE  ODD  CLAUSES: UNDERSTANDING THE  CONSTITUTION  THROUGH  TEN 
OF  ITS  MOST  CURIOUS  PROVISIONS 157–76 (2011), an account influenced by Levy (minus the 
bile). 
10. For recent work in this line, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 43–64 (2010); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
17–18 (2013); SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE  ORIGINAL  EXECUTIVE 142–70 (2015); David J. Barron & Martin S. Leder-
man, The Commander in Chief at Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
941, 946–49, 951–80 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief]; David J. 
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, 
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 712, 772–99 (2008); Mark E. 
Brandon, War and the Constitutional Order, in THE  CONSTITUTION IN  WARTIME: BEYOND 
ALARMISM AND  COMPLACENCY 21–24 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); John C. Dehn, The Com-
mander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 
608–25 (2011). 
11. Steilen, supra note 2, at 889–96. 
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sembly was the central repository of sovereignty in a republic and thus 
had critical legal functions in wartime. Bills of attainder are now 
banned by the Constitution, but Congress retains a power to consti-
tute commissions and similar summary proceedings where armed con-
flict has frustrated the course of civil justice.12 Modern accounts of 
legislative power tend to obscure the legal character of much that tra-
ditionally occurred in legislative bodies, as well as persistent disagree-
ments about what the limits of ‘legislative’ power should be.13  These 
disputes have continued well into the present age. Just last term, for 
example, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Congress’ power to pass a bill 
that prescribed a rule “for a single, pending case” thought to implicate 
national security interests.14  Philips’s attainder reflects a set of back-
ground conventions against which such ‘legislative’ powers are 
intelligible.15 
12. For the ban on bills of attainder, see U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3; United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 (1965). On Congress’s authority to establish military commissions 
where civil courts are closed, and to define the law such bodies apply, see Art. I, § 8, cl. 10–11, 
14–16, 18; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591–92 (2006); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 
304, 314 (1946); see generally 2 WILLIAM  WINTHROP, MILITARY  LAW AND  PRECEDENTS 
1295–1321 (2d ed. 1896) (describing historical uses of military commissions). 
13. The legal activities of wartime state legislatures look a lot like those of early eighteenth-
century colonial assemblies, complicating a standard historical narrative about their institutional 
development. See, e.g., MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMER-
ICAN COLONIES 58 (1943) (judicial powers of assemblies “were exercised now and then up to the 
Revolution . . . [but] activity of this sort tended to be less common as the colonies advanced”); 
MICHAEL  KAMMEN, DEPUTYES AND  LIBERTYES: THE  ORIGINS OF  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERN-
MENT IN COLONIAL AMERICA 57 (1969) (lower houses “largely shed their early exercise of broad 
judicial powers” at the end of the seventeenth century); Alison Olson, Eighteenth-Century Colo-
nial Legislatures and their Constituents, 79 J. AM. HIST. 543, 556 (1992) (describing a shift away 
from judicial proceedings towards “legislative action” after mid-eighteenth century). For ac-
counts that feature adjudication in eighteenth-century colonial assemblies, see MARY  SARAH 
BILDER, THE  TRANSATLANTIC  CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL  LEGAL  CULTURE AND THE  EMPIRE 
77–83 (2004) (equity); Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adju-
dication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1404, 1407 (1998) (treasury). 
14. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, No. 14-770, slip. op. at 19 (S. Ct. Apr. 20, 2016).  Except for 
impeachment, most of Congress’s quasi-legal powers are skipped over in a standard Constitu-
tional Law class.  Thus, for example, Congress exercises powers to issue compulsory process 
summoning witnesses and requesting the production documents (backed by contempt), and to 
conduct investigations as part of its oversight of government. For an introduction, see MICHAEL 
STOKES  PAULSEN, STEVEN G. CALABRESI ET AL., THE  CONSTITUTION OF THE  UNITED  STATES 
247–57, 283–96 (2d ed. 2013).  Early Congresses received a significant number of petitions and 
passed private bills in response. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs 
and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1888–92 (2010). 
15. These conventions are historical and institutional, rather than functional. See William 
B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 263, 265–66 (1989) (“[T]he terms ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ power . . . refer, not 
to single governmental functions, but to a variety of functions exercised by the two houses of 
Parliament on the one hand and those exercised by the monarch, his officials, and his advisors, 
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Second, the subsequent dispute about the Philips case illustrates 
the complexity of judicial efforts to check the prosecution of loyalists 
by enforcing the state law of treason and international, customary 
laws of war. One of the central questions raised in the case was 
whether Philips was a prisoner of war and entitled to protection under 
the laws of war. Virginia judges may have blocked his prosecution for 
treason on this basis (we can’t know for certain), but boundaries be-
tween treason and other crimes were permeable, and a felony prose-
cution under domestic law was allowed to go forward.16 The result 
points to a willingness of early state courts to question the legal status 
of individuals in war, but also to the intrinsic difficulty of these is-
sues.17  Political membership and legal status were central to Virgini-
ans’ efforts to govern and protect themselves, and the importance of 
these issues explains why the Philips affair came up, ten years after his 
execution, at the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. The delegates’ 
dispute thereby gives the Case of Josiah Philips a significance not un-
like the extradition of Thomas Nash in 1799 or even the Neutrality 
Controversy of 1793.18 
16. It thus overstates matters to say, as have two distinguished commentators, that “[i]n 
1789, war was a fundamental concept in public international law–sharply distinguishable from 
peace–to which particular legal consequences attached.  During war, elaborate rules of belliger-
ency governed relations between warring states.” Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Con-
gressional Authorization and the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2059 (2005) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
17. These concerns have led some modern judges to disarow an authority to inquire into a 
prisoner’s status altogether. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 585–86 (2004) (“[T]he ques-
tion whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant is of a kind for which the Judiciary has 
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the do-
main of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although Justice Thomas’s opinion is a dissent, 
the ‘fate’ of Hamdi as administered by the D.C. Circuit has arguably produced a result not like 
the one Thomas thought appropriate. See PAUL BREST & SANDFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1071–72 (6th ed. 2014). 
18. The Nash affair may not be known to all constitutional lawyers.  Nash was allegedly a 
British seaman. The British charged him with mutiny aboard a British ship. He was taken into 
custody by the Americans and the British requested his extradition.  President Adams asked the 
federal judge with jurisdiction over Nash to deliver him, and the judge held a habeas hearing, at 
which Nash claimed to be an American by the name of Jonathan Robbins—a claim that may 
have been true. The judge transferred him anyway and Nash (or Robbins) was executed soon 
after, causing an uproar. See David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” Concept of Judi-
cial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 304–14 (1992); Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s 
Questions, 2 GREEN  BAG  2D 367 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of 
Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 304 (1990).  The Neutrality Controversy is a central epi-
sode in today’s separation of powers canon, and there is an immense literature on the event. For 
recent commentary, see HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN  GROUND: HOW  PRESIDENTS  INTER-
PRET THE  CONSTITUTION 42–47 (2015); GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 18–23; WILLIAM R. CASTO, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 19–35, 59–102 (2006). 
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I propose, then, to revisit the case, and my study will have four 
parts.  In Part I, I draw on legislative records, executive records, news-
papers, letters and early histories to determine what we know about 
Josiah Philips and his attainder.  Unlike prior commentators, I situate 
Jefferson’s bill of attainder within the English legal tradition from 
which it originated. The bill’s clear place in this tradition, its proper 
uses as described in the parliamentary treatises and other law books 
on which Jefferson typically drew, and evidence that others in the 
General Assembly accepted these uses, suggests that most of those 
involved thought it lawful for the assembly to attaint Philips. The 
question then becomes why some Virginians were uncomfortable with 
it. 
In Part II, I examine the statements of Randolph, Henry, Jeffer-
son and Tucker that have been the source of much of the mystery 
surrounding the case.  Setting each statement in the shifting constitu-
tional surround, I argue that the mystery is largely a result of re-telling 
the story over time, adjusting emphasis and filling gaps in accordance 
with purposes and assumptions then dominant. Thus, as I read the 
Randolph-Henry exchange at the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, 
the two men shared a belief that republican assemblies should possess 
legal powers, but disagreed as to the form and scope of those pow-
ers.19  Neither man seems to have thought this allocation inconsistent 
with the vaunted separation of powers provision in the 1776 state con-
stitution.20 Randolph’s discomfort grew, rather, from a sense that 
emergency proceedings in the assembly corrupted the ordinary course 
of law.  Yet, that the state’s assembly should be denied residual pow-
ers to do justice and to protect Virginia citizens was a difficult proposi-
tion to sustain.  These were textbook examples of royal prerogative 
power, and in a republic, the popular assembly was arguably their nat-
19. Randolph supported a council of revision, which he conceived as a kind of legislative 
mechanism for judicial review. See infra Part II.D, note 131, and accompanying text. 
20. Declaration of Rights, § 5, in 2 BEN: PERLEY POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, COLONIAL  CHARTERS, AND  OTHER  ORGANIC  LAWS OF THE  UNITED  STATES 1909 
(1877) (“Sect. 5. That the legislative and executive powers of the State should be separate and 
distinct from the judiciary . . . .”).  For representative readings of this section, see WILLI  PAUL 
ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF 
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 267 (2001 ed.) (“Virginia’s constitu-
tion of June 1776 was the first constitutional document since the Instrument of Government . . . 
to include the principle of separation of powers in express terms.  It did so with a clarity that no 
previous statement of either theory or practice had achieved.”); SCOTT  DOUGLAS  GERBER, A 
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ural home.21 Indeed, state assemblies continued to exercise residual 
legal powers and to interfere in the proceedings of courts well into the 
nineteenth century, despite judicial efforts to check the practice using 
due process principles.22 
With this context, I turn in Part III to St. George Tucker’s claim 
that Virginia judges refused to enforce the act of attainder. The claim 
has long been regarded as erroneous, due to Philips’s capture before 
the end of the grace period in the act.23 I argue that Tucker may have 
been correct. Were Philips to be timely taken into custody, the act of 
attainder required that he be tried for treason, and trying a loyalist for 
treason in a civil conflict like the Revolution raised serious legal diffi-
culties. Treason required allegiance; did Philips owe Virginia alle-
giance? He claimed to hold a British military commission, which 
would have made him a belligerent, not a traitor. The laws of war 
required that Virginia hold belligerents as prisoners of war.24 Was 
Philips a member of the Virginia political community, then, or was he 
a foreign subject? Or was he outside both communities, an outlaw, or 
like one of the escaped slaves in his gang? Courts in states with signifi-
cant loyalist populations struggled with these questions during the 
21. On the prerogative source of the obligations to do justice and to protect subjects, see 2 
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S  COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 262, 266–68 (1803). On the place of 
royal prerogative in American state and national governments in this period, see KATHLEEN 
BARTOLONI-TUAZON, FOR FEAR OF AN ELECTIVE KING: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE PRES-
IDENTIAL TITLE CONTROVERSY OF 1789, at 57–64 (2014); BILDER, supra note 13, at 73–83; MAR-
KUS  DUBBER, THE  POLICE  POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE  FOUNDATIONS OF  AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 83–85 (2005); JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANS-
FER OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774–1776, at 20–31, 34 (1987); BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THE 
KING’S THREE FACES: THE RISE AND FALL OF ROYAL AMERICA, 1688–1776, at 303 (2006); ERIC 
NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 149 (2014); 
JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 85–99 (abr. ed. 
1995); Matthew Crow, Thomas Jefferson and the Uses of Equity, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 153, 
168–69 (2015); Jack N. Rakove, Taking the Prerogative out of the Presidency: An Originalist 
Perspective, 37 PRES. STUDS. Q. 85, 89–90 (2007). 
22. See generally JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 45–46 (2003); 
JOHN  PHILLIP  REID, LEGISLATING THE  COURTS: JUDICIAL  DEPENDENCE IN  EARLY  NATIONAL 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 3–17 (2009); Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as 
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1703–26 (2012); Wallace Mendelson, A Missing Link 
in the Evolution of Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REV. 125, 126–28 (1956). Other early constitutional 
‘hooks’ for this effort were the Ex Post Facto Clauses. See Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post 
Facto Clause, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 727, 753–67, and the Contract Clause, see also 3–4 G. EDWARD 
WHITE, HISTORY OF THE  SUPREME  COURT OF THE  UNITED  STATES: THE  MARSHALL  COURT 
AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 595–673 (1988). 
23. See, e.g., CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at 944; Turner, supra note 3. 
24. E.g., EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk.III, ch.VIII, ss.140, 149, at 347–48, 
354–55 (tr. 1797) (1896); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Lec. V, at 88–89 
(1826); see STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
147–51, 163–65, 194–98 (2014); JOHN  FABIAN  WITT, LINCOLN’S  CODE: THE  LAWS OF  WAR IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 16–23 (2012). 
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Revolution.25 Some lawyers like St. George Tucker among them, 
urged state courts to enforce the protections in state constitutions and 
the law of nations, investing those bodies with a “national security” 
function like that of the early federal courts.26 Yet lawyers also made 
opportunistic use of domestic criminal law, and state courts permitted 
prosecutions for ordinary felonies, at least on occasion, rather than 
require proceedings under military jurisdiction on charges of war 
crime. 
Finally, in Part IV, I step away from the case, and argue that 
changes in the understanding of the bill of attainder tracked changes 
in the understanding of the popular assembly itself. The idea that a 
bill of attainder was a summary legal procedure suited to times of civil 
disorder was not uncommon in the 1760s and 1770s, at least among 
well-read lawyers.  But by the mid-1780s, bills of attainder were often 
described as arbitrary exercises of legislative power. This framing 
would better justify courts of law in enforcing bans on bills of attain-
der, since, as Hamilton put it, “specific exceptions to the legislative 
authority . . . can be preserved in practice no other way than through 
the medium of the courts.”27  On these grounds courts of law would 
claim not only a power void acts of attainder passed by the legislature, 
but more generally to superintend legislative decisions about when 
summary procedures could be used in place of the common law. 
I. JOSIAH PHILIPS CIRCA 1778 
The Josiah Philips gang was not unique in the Revolutionary War 
period, although its methods were not widely representative either. 
More often, resistance in loyalist strongholds probably looked like 
Queens, New York, where the disaffected ignored the orders of the ad 
25. See BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON 46–80 (1964); CLAUDE HAL-
STEAD  VAN  TYNE, THE  LOYALISTS IN THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 268–85 (1902). Leading 
examples are New York and Pennsylvania. On New York in particular, see DANIEL  HUL-
SEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM IN THE  ATLANTIC  WORLD, 1664-1830, at 111–69 (2005); On Pennsylvania, see Henry J. 
Young, Treason and Its Punishment in Revolutionary Pennsylvania, PA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 287, 
298 (1966); Steilen, supra note 2, at 857–89. 
26. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 71, 130–41 (1995) 
[hereinafter Casto, SUPREME COURT]; see also Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief, supra 
note 10, at 952–55, 963, 967–70; Dehn, supra note 10, at 616–25.  Another framing of this role for 
courts is that they functioned to promote vigorous or good government, ‘protecting’ government 
from anarchy by enforcing respect for acts. See, e.g., 1 JULIUS  GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME  COURT OF THE  UNITED  STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND  BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 634 
(1971). 
27. See infra note 187. 
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hoc ‘Whig’ assemblies attempting to govern, and the militant wel-
comed or even joined the invading British army.28  Elsewhere loyalism 
mixed with a kind of organized crime. In Maryland, for example, on 
the eastern shore of Chesapeake Bay, Hamilton Callilo and Thomas 
Moore led a gang engaged in “piracy and robbery mixed with loyal-
ism,” for which Callilo was made an outlaw.29 In Pennsylvania, the 
Doan family robbed tax collectors and destroyed state property into 
the 1780s, for which several members were also outlawed.30  The Nu-
gent and Shockey gang made a name for itself in robbery and counter-
feiting, offenses to which a number of loyalist syndicates became 
dedicated.31 From the perspective of the new state governments 
formed in 1776 and 1777, these militant, criminal loyalists posed a seri-
ous challenge.  States like New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia strug-
gled to administer civil justice and protect citizens across their 
expansive territories, and in some cases militants were able to operate 
in essentially ungoverned areas.  As we will see in Philips’s case, it was 
militants’ presence in those spaces—where civil process did not run 
and magistrates could not police—that required the use of institutions 
like outlawry and attainder.32 
Philips was a laborer from Lynhaven Parish, in the very southeast 
portion of Virginia.33  He became disaffected with the movement to-
wards independence. In August 1775, he was seen “command[ing] an 
ignorant disorderly mob, in direct opposition to the measures of this 
country.”34 Some two years later, in June 1777, Colonel John Wilson, 
head of the Norfolk County militia, complained of “sundry evil dis-
posed persons, to the number of ten, or twelve,” who were “lurking in 
secret places threatening and doing actual mischief to the peaceable 
28. ALEXANDER  CLARENCE  FLICK, LOYALISM IN  NEW  YORK  DURING THE  AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 37–57 (1901); ALAN  TAYLOR, AMERICAN  REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL  HIS-
TORY, 1750–1804, at 213–16 (2016); VAN TYNE, supra note 25, at 87–89. 
29. CHAPIN, supra note 25, at 59.  Outlaws surrendered their protection under the law for 
failing to appear before a court to answer charges against them. See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & 
FREDERIC  WILLIAM  MAITLAND, THE  HISTORY OF  ENGLISH  LAW  BEFORE THE  TIME OF  ED-
WARD I 539, 554 (2d ed. 1898); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 580–81 (2d. ed. 1898). 
30. Respublica v. Doan, 1 U.S. 86, 92–93 (Pa. 1784); ANNE M. OUSTERHOUT, A STATE 
DIVIDED: OPPOSITION IN PENNSYLVANIA TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 213–14 (1987). 
31. Henry J. Young, Treason and Its Punishment in Revolutionary Pennsylvania, 90.3 PA. 
MAG. HIST. & BIO. 287, 298 (1966). 
32. See infra Part I. 
33. Trent, supra note 9, at 444–45. 
34. THIRD  VIRGINIA  CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE  CONVENTION OF  DELEGATES 
FOR THE COUNTIES AND CORPORATIONS IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA (1775). 
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and well affected Inhabitants” of the area.35  At their head was Josiah 
Philips.36 Counted among the party, as well, were a number of “run-
away slaves,” drawn perhaps by Lord Dunmore’s promise in Novem-
ber 1775 to free slaves who fought for the King.37 Indeed, “irregular 
armed gangs” of runaways would raid Virginia farms and plantations 
for the British throughout the Revolution.38  In response to Colonel 
Wilson’s letter, the state’s Privy Council, an executive council selected 
by the legislature, recommended that Governor Patrick Henry “issue 
a proclamation offering a reward” to anyone who apprehended 
Philips and brought him before a magistrate “to be dealt with accord-
ing to Law.”39  Philips was captured that winter, only to escape some-
time in early 1778.40  He proved difficult to recapture, in part because 
of the geography of the Dismal Swamp, where Philips had his hideout, 
and in part because of “the disaffection which prevailed in that quar-
ter.”41 The gang had supporters—or at least few were willing to cross 
them. By May 1778, they numbered around fifty; a muster of three 
militia companies to go after Philips raised only ten men, and the ex-
pedition failed.42 Several days later, the commanding officer was 
killed in an ambush near his home, being “fired on by four men con-
cealed in [his neighbor’s] house.”43  Colonel Wilson wrote to Gover-
nor Henry on May 20, informing him of the attack and complaining of 
“disaffection” in area residents, who sympathized with “Philips and 
35. JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VA.: JULY 12, 1776-OCTOBER 2, 1777 at 
435 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 1931) [hereinafter JCS VA: 1776-1777]. 
36. Id. (spelling Philips’s name “Phillips”). 
37. ECKENRODE, supra note 9, at 66, 191–92 (1916).  Slave loyalism was widespread in the 
Revolution, despite the fact that Dunmore’s promise was not an “official government policy.” 
MARSTON, supra note 21, at 55.  There is evidence that slaves in some communities felt a signifi-
cant attachment to King George, whom they viewed as a benevolent monarch who intended to 
free his enslaved peoples from the lordship of “local pharaohs.” MCCONVILLE, supra note 21, at 
175–76, 181–82. Among the local pharaohs, of course, were members of the Virginia planter 
class now leading an American Revolution. 
38. ALAN TAYLOR, THE INTERNAL ENEMY: SLAVERY AND WAR IN VIRGINIA, 1772-1832, at 
27, 41 (2013) [hereinafter TAYLOR, INTERNAL ENEMY].  After the revolution, as well—and espe-
cially following the bloody revolt in Saint-Domingue (modern-day Haiti)—white Virginians 
lived in fear of slave revolts, many imagined but some very real. See id. at 86–87, 89–97. 
39. JCS VA.: 1776-1777 supra note 35, at 435–36. 
40. 2 JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VA.: OCTOBER 6, 1777-NOVEMBER 30, 
1781 58 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 1932) [hereinafter JCS VA: 1777-1781]; Bill to Attaint, supra note 
1, at 192; ECKENRODE, supra note 9, at 191. 
41. WILLIAM WIRT, Letter from County Lieutenant John Wilson to Patrick Henry (May 20, 
1778), in SKETCHES of THE  LIFE OF  PATRICK  HENRY 217 (1817).  The Dismal Swamp was the 
location of “the largest and longest-lived runaway community” of slaves. TAYLOR, INTERNAL 
ENEMY, supra note 38, at 76. 
42. JCS VA.: 1777-1781, supra note 40, at 127; WIRT, supra note 41, at 235–36. 
43. WIRT, supra note 41, at 218. 
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his notorious gang.”44  The fate suffered by the commanding officer 
would surely visit others, he predicted, unless “the relations and 
friends of those villains” were removed from the area.45 
Henry received Wilson’s letter several days later and shared it 
immediately with Jefferson, who was then a leading member of the 
House of Delegates.46 According to Jefferson, “we both thought the 
best proceeding would be by bill of attainder.”47 Around the same 
time, Henry showed the letter to the Privy Council, which advised the 
governor to forward the letter to the legislature and to order a com-
pany of regulars to the area “to cooperate with the Militia in crushing 
these Desperadoes.”48 James Madison was among the councilors.49 
On May 27, Henry sent the correspondence to Benjamin Harrison, 
then Speaker of the lower house.50  The governor’s cover letter de-
scribed an “insurrection in Princess Anne and Norfolk,” which he had 
sought, unsuccessfully, to “quell” using the county militias.  Colonel 
Wilson had requested that the governor “remov[e] such families as are 
in league with the insurgents,” but, Henry continued, “thinking that 
the executive power is not competent to such a purpose, I must beg 
leave to submit the whole matter to the assembly, who are the only 
judges how far the methods of proceeding directed by law are to be 
dispensed with on occasion.”51 Asking the assembly to authorize the 
removal contrasted with Henry’s conduct nine months earlier, when 
on the advice of his council he had promptly removed disaffected and 
“suspected” persons, and been indemnified by the assembly later.52 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Wirt (Aug. 14, 1814), in 7 THE  PAPERS OF 
THOMAS  JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT  SERIES 548–49 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., Princeton Univ. 
Press 2010) (1743–1836) [hereinafter Wirt Letter, 1814] 
47. Id. 
48. JCS VA.: 1777-1781, supra note 40, at 140; Trent, supra note 9, at 446. 
49. Turner, supra note 3, at 329–30. Other members of the council included Dudley Digges, 
John Blair, Nathaniel Harrison, David Jameson and John Page. RALPH LOUIS KETCHAM, JAMES 
MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 79 (1st ed. 1990). Ketcham lists Blair among the councilors “present 
when Madison took his seat” on January 14, 1778, although Blair was appointed to a judgeship 
on the General Court shortly thereafter, on January 23, 1778. See infra note 99 and accompany-
ing text. 
50. WILLIAM  WIRT, Letter from Patrick Henry to Benjamin Harrison (May 27, 1778), in 
THE LIFE OF PATRICK HENRY 219–21 (1817). 
51. Id. 
52. In April 1776, prior to independence, a colonial Committee of Safety had ordered the 
removal of disaffected persons from Norfolk and Princess Anne, but then retracted its resolution 
in May.  Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Virginia Convention of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary 
Politics 119 (1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author). 
After the appearance of the British navy in the Chesapeake next year, Governor Henry and his 
council decided to remove disaffected persons from the area; then, in October 1777, the assem-
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Speaker Harrison immediately referred Henry’s letter to a com-
mittee of the whole house “on the state of the commonwealth.” That 
committee deliberated the next morning, May 28, and then reported a 
resolution the same day.53  What Henry had called an “insurrection,” 
the committee labeled treason. “Information being received,” they 
wrote, “that a certain Philips, with divers others, . . . have levied war 
against this commonwealth . . . committing murders, burning houses, 
wasting farms, and doing other acts of enormity, in defiance of the 
officers of justice,” it was resolved that Philips and “his associates, and 
confederates” should “render themselves to some officer” within 
June, or “such of them as fail so to do ought to be attainted of high 
treason.”54  The assertion that the Philips gang had committed treason 
by murder and arson incorporated a significant legal claim, namely, 
that the latter offenses constituted “levying war,” one of the ancient 
varieties of treason.55  In the interim, it would be “lawful for any per-
son . . . to pursue and slay, or otherwise to take and deliver to jus-
tice . . . Philips, his associates and confederates.”56  Upon receipt of 
the resolution, the House appointed Jefferson, along with lawyer John 
Tyler (later Governor), to a committee to draft a bill. A bill was dock-
eted the same day, May 28, by the clerk of the House, a young Ed-
mund Randolph.57 
bly indemnified the governor and council for the decision (as they described it) “to remove and 
restrain, during the imminence of the danger, at a distance from the post and encampments from 
the [Virginia] militia, and from other places near the ports and harbours of this commonwealth, 
certain persons whose affections to the American cause were suspected, and more especially 
such as had refused to give assurance of fidelity and allegiance to the commonwealth.” An Act 
for indemnifying the Governor and Council, and others, for removing and confining Suspected 
Persons during the late public danger. 1617 Va. Acts 373–74. Jefferson apparently drafted this 
bill (as he did the Philips attainder). Bill Indemnifying the Executive for Removing and Confin-
ing Suspected Persons (Dec. 16 – 26, 1777), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 119 (Julian 
P. Boyd ed., 1950).  On the whole, then, Virginia acted both prospectively and retroactively to 
authorize the governor to address security threats posed by loyalists. See MARGARET BURNHAM 
MACMILLAN, THE  WAR  GOVERNORS IN THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 83 (1943). Both ap-
proaches show an active role for the General Assembly in directing the use of state force. See 
Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief, supra note 10, at 782, 789. 
53. See WIRT, supra note 41, at 220. 
54. Id. at 221. 
55. What constitutes “levying war” is the subject of the doctrine of “constructive treason.” 
By Chapin’s analysis, an insurrection (as Henry had called it) would clearly be a form of con-
structive treason, but murder, arson and robbery might not. CHAPIN, supra note 25, at 7; Thomas 
P. Slaughter, “The King of Crimes”: Early American Treason Law, 1787-1860, in LAUNCHING 
THE “EXTENDED REPUBLIC” THE FEDERALIST ERA 58–78 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert 
eds., 1996). Chapin observes that Virginia accepted the doctrine of constructive treason later in 
the war, at least in principle. CHAPIN, supra note 25, at 174. 
56. WIRT, supra note 41, at 221. 
57. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VA. 34 (May 5, 1777–June 1, 1778); 9 THE 
DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY OF THE  RATIFICATION OF THE  CONSTITUTION 1004 n.5 (John P. Ka-
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The draft bill, which was preserved and published as part of Jef-
ferson’s papers, is relatively unremarkable as an example of attainder. 
Indeed, its language and function would have been instantly recogniz-
able to a student of parliamentary history—as Jefferson himself was— 
and it is likely that Jefferson emulated bills he had encountered in his 
reading.58  Over most of its history, the bill of attainder had served as 
a device for the king and his allies to punish treasonous conduct by 
great men who were too powerful for the common law courts at West-
minster or who could not be reached by their process.59  Bill proceed-
ing in Parliament operated as a kind of summary legal procedure, in 
the sense that it enabled the government to convict an individual 
whose serious criminal conduct was widely known, without the pres-
ence of the accused or any presentation of testimonial evidence.60 
Those involved largely spoke and wrote about bills of attainder as le-
gal proceedings, a view that contrasts markedly with our own, which 
(if it acknowledges the bill of attainder at all) treats it as an exercise of 
legislative power.  Proponents connected the bill of attainder to a 
body of continental legal commentary on summary proceedings by 
describing the widely-known treasons it targeted as “notorious”—an 
expression that one encounters, remarkably, in sources as various as 
minski & Gaspare J. Saladino et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter “9 DHRC”] (noting that Randolph 
docketed the bill as clerk). 
58. Jefferson would have read of bills of attainder in his study of Hatsell’s Precedents and 
Rushworth’s Collections, among other sources. H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERI-
ENCE: WHIG  HISTORY AND THE  INTELLECTUAL  ORIGINS OF THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 
159–60 (1965) (describing Jefferson’s study of Rushworth); H.R. DOC. NO. 111–157, at 127 
(2011) (quoting Jefferson, “I could not doubt the necessity of quoting the sources of my informa-
tion, among which Mr. Hatsel’s most valuable book is preeminent”); Morris L. Cohen, Thomas 
Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 823, 842 (1971) (recom-
mending the study of “Hatsell’s Precedents of the House of Commons” and “Select Parliam’y 
debates of England and Ireland”); 2 CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 233 
(E. Millicent Sowerby ed., 1953) [hereinafter Sowerby] (including volume 1 of the 1706 edition 
of the Statutes at Large, which indexed the attainders of Jack Cade and Elizabeth Barton); 
Sowerby, supra, at 300 (volume 1 of Pemberton’s History of Tryals, which described the attain-
der of Thomas Cromwell, among others).  Jefferson could also have studied acts of attainder in 
Coke’s Third Institute, in the section on Parliament, but the accounts given there were distorted 
to some degree by Coke’s efforts to elevate the place of the common law above the ‘law and 
course of Parliament.’ 
59. Steilen, supra note 2, at 775; see also J.G. BELLAMY, THE  LAW OF  TREASON IN  EN-
GLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 102–03, 177–205 (1970); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE 
HUMAN  RIGHTS IN THE  CONSTITUTION 90–161 (1956); COLIN G. C. TITE, IMPEACHMENT AND 
PARLIAMENTARY JUDICATURE IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND 16, 83–148 (1974); J.R. Lander, At-
tainder and Forfeiture, 1453–1509, in 2 HISTORICAL  STUDIES OF THE  ENGLISH  PARLIAMENT, 
1399–1603, at 92–124 (E.B. Fryde & Edward Miller eds., 1970); William Richard Stacy, The Bill 
of Attainder in English History (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 1986) (on file with author). 
60. Steilen, supra note 2, at 793–96, 802–04, 824–26. 
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medieval bills of attainder (notoriement in Anglo-Norman) and bills 
passed in eighteenth-century America.61 Across their long history, 
bills of attainder generally took two different forms.  Some bills of 
attainder ordered an individual to submit himself to ordinary proceed-
ings at common law, functioning like a kind of parliamentary out-
lawry.62  Modern commentators describe this first form as the 
“conditional” or “suspensive” attainder.  It was suspensive in the 
sense that the attainted individual’s surrender would suspend his con-
viction, which might then be reinstated after a common-law proceed-
ing.  Anyone who failed to timely surrender would be attainted by 
force of the act alone, after expiration of a grace period.  Other bills of 
attainder, such as those that applied to the dead, simply pronounced 
their targets guilty of a notorious offense. Commentators sometimes 
call this second form the “absolute” attainder.63  Many bills, of course, 
combined these forms to reach different individuals with different 
effect. 
Jefferson’s bill was a suspensive attainder. It shared much in 
common with suspensive attainders employed elsewhere during the 
Revolution, such as Pennsylvania.64  Following the committee resolu-
tion, the bill alleged that Philips had committed treason.  “[C]ontrary 
to their fidelity,” wrote Jefferson, the gang had “levied war against 
this Commonwealth,” committing murder, arson and robbery, “and 
still continue to exercise the same enormities.”65 Outlawing Philips, 
which would require his summons at successive sessions of court over 
a period of months, was far too slow a process in these circumstances. 
To “outlaw the said offenders according to the usual forms and proce-
dures of the courts of law would leave the said good people for a long 
time exposed to murder and devastation.”66  Instead, the bill set out a 
suspensive attainder, giving Philips and his gang until an unspecified 
day in June to surrender.  If Philips failed to surrender by the end of 
61. See COLLINS, supra note 2, at 19, 21 (2016) (discussing notoriety and “notorious”); see 
also T.F.T. Plucknett, The Origins of Impeachment, 24 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 47, 
59–61, 63–67, (1941); Steilen, supra note 2, at 889–90 (discussing American bills of attainder and 
related summer procedures that used the word, specifically, identifying New York and Penn-
sylvania measures); Kenneth Pennington, Two Essays on Court Procedure: The Jurisprudence of 
Procedure 185, 205–06 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
62. See 1 FREDERICK, supra note 29, at 279–80 (discussing outlawry). 
63. See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 59, at 184–88. 
64. Steilen, supra note 2, at 885–86; see also CHAPIN, supra note 25, at 55, 78–80; LEVY, 
supra note 9, at 71–72; VAN TYNE, supra note 25, at 190–242, 268–85; James Westfall Thompson, 
Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. REV. 147, 157–59 (1909). 
65. Bill to Attaint, supra note 1, at 189–90. 
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the grace period, he could be killed on sight, effectively deputizing the 
state’s citizens and thereby extending its executive force.67 If, on the 
other hand, Philips surrendered before the grace period expired, he 
could claim a common-law trial. Crucially, since the act charged 
Philips with having “levied war,” a kind of treason, that trial would 
presumably be on charges of treason.  Philips was not the only target. 
Like other such attainders, Jefferson’s bill was general in scope, at-
tainting Philips by name but including, as well, his unnamed “associ-
ates and confederates.”68  Alleged gang members would be permitted 
to contest their affiliation and obtain a trial on this issue “according to 
the forms of law.”69 
The bill passed swiftly through the assembly. After an initial 
reading in the House of Delegates on May 28, it was read a second 
time on May 29 and a third time on May 30; Jefferson was immedi-
ately ordered to carry the bill into the Senate, which reported its con-
currence later that day.70  Representatives made only minor changes 
to Jefferson’s draft, and gave Philips until the last day in June to sur-
render.71  “An act to attaint Josiah Philips and others” was reported 
the following week in the Virginia Gazette.72 
The research of Jesse Turner in 1914 revealed that Philips was in 
fact captured before the end of the grace period on the last day of 
June.73  Excerpts from court records show that Philips was indicted by 
67. The other central function of the bill of attainder—obtaining a right to the attainted 
person’s property—was likely of little importance in Philips’s case. Cf. Steilen, supra note 2, at 
775 (describing six functions served by English bills of attainder). 
68. Bill to Attaint, supra note 1, at 190; see also An Act for preventing tumultuous and 
riotous Assemblies in the Places therein mentioned, and for the more speedy and effectual pun-
ishing the Rioters, 5 THE  COLONIAL  LAWS OF  NEW  YORK  FROM THE  YEAR 1664 TO THE 
REVOLUTION 647 (James B. Lyon ed., 1894) (providing another example of a general act of 
attainder). 
69. Bill to Attaint, supra note 1, at 190. 
70. JOURNAL OF THE  HOUSE OF  DELEGATES OF  VA., supra note 57, at 28, 32, 35 (1778); 
Trent, supra note 9, at 446–47, 447 n.2 (correcting Wirt on the basis of the House Journal). 
71. An act to attaint Josiah Philips and others, unless they render themselves to justice 
within a certain time, VA STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 1. Contra Bill to Attaint, supra note 
1, at 193 nn.1–10. 
72. THE  VIRGINIA  GAZETTE (Purdie) (June 5, 1778), p. 2, col. 2. Like other acts, acts of 
attainder were regularly published in colonial and state newspapers.  This entry does not de-
scribe the content of the act attainting Philips, including the thirty-day grace period. 
73. Turner, supra note 3, at 338–39. The document Turner discovered describes an 
examination of Philips by a judge on charges that he had committed a robbery, after which 
Philips is committed to jail.  The date of the proceeding is June 11, 1778. Id. at 339; see also 
VIRGINIA GAZETTE (Purdie) (June 19, 1778), p. 2, col. 2 (“Last Tuesday the noted Josiah Philips 
and James Hodges were safely lodged in the publick jail by the sheriff of Princess Anne. They 
were taken the 4th instant, at night, in Norfolk County.”). Prior to Turner, the view had been 
that Philips was captured in the late summer or autumn of 1778, after the grace period had 
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a grand jury on October 20, 1778—not for treason, however, but for 
robbery “of twenty-eight men’s felt hats . . . and five pounds of 
twine.”74  Edmund Randolph, who had been clerk of the House of 
Delegates when Philips was attainted, was then the state’s Attorney 
General, and apparently initiated this prosecution. Tried by jury and 
found guilty, Philips was sentenced to death and executed in Decem-
ber 1778.75 
II. JOSIAH PHILIPS REDUX 
One of the great challenges of the Philips attainder is; that the 
record freely admixes history and memory.  Much of what we know 
about the case derives from later accounts given by Randolph, Henry, 
Tucker, and Jefferson, which rest, ostensibly, on personal recollection. 
Together, these statements raise a number of difficult questions; Ed-
mund Randolph’s account, in particular, seems at odds with the insti-
tutional records that have been preserved. There is no easy way to 
deal with these difficulties.  My approach below is to excerpt the rele-
vant statements and then consider what they might mean in context. 
Proceeding in this fashion gives us three groups: (A) statements by 
Randolph and Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratification convention of 
1788; (B) an account given by St. George Tucker in annotations to his 
edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in 1803 but likely 
written in the early 1790s; and (C) a series of letters written by 
Thomas Jefferson between 1814 and 1816. 
It is admittedly a bit tedious to try and sort all this out, but reex-
amining what Randolph, Henry, Tucker and Jefferson said about the 
Philips case does prove to have several benefits. First, it shows that 
Randolph’s account, while erroneous in several minor respects, can be 
expired.  This view was based on statements made by Jefferson and entries in the Privy Council 
journal authorizing rewards for the capture. Girardin Letter, supra note 8, at 337; Trent, supra 
note 9, at 448; see generally WIRT, supra note 41, at 216–25. 
74. An Endictment Against Josiah Philips For Robbery (Oct. 20, 1778), in WIRT, supra note 
41, at xi (noting that “true bill” was written on the indictment in Edmund Randolph’s handwrit-
ing); see also VIRGINIA  GAZETTE (Purdie) (Oct. 30, 1778), p. 3, col. 2 (reporting a “trial [of 
Josiah Philips and others] . . . for robbing the publick waggons”). The original court records 
were reportedly destroyed during the Civil War. Trent, supra note 9, at 448. Wirt told Jefferson 
sometime in 1815 or 1816 that he had discovered the records. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
William Wirt (Oct. 8, 1816), in 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 438 
(J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2013) [hereinafter Writ Letter, 1816]. 
75. WIRT, supra note 41, at xi–xii (reproducing Philips’s verdict, judgment, sentence, and a 
report of his execution); see also VIRGINIA GAZETTE (Dixon & Hunter) (Dec. 4, 1778), p. 2., col. 
2 (“This day were executed at the gallows near this city, pursuant to their sentence, the following 
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interpreted in a way that renders it largely accurate. There are errors 
in Randolph’s retelling, to be sure, but they are best described as er-
rors of emphasis, as the colorization one adds to a story to enhance its 
rhetorical effect.  There is a second benefit as well. A close reading of 
the record suggests that we have missed the point of Randolph’s argu-
ment almost entirely. The perception that Randolph’s account was 
grossly erroneous arises, I think, from a failure to think about the in-
stitution of the wartime representative assembly as did Randolph and 
his principal interlocutor, Henry.  For them the assembly was the cen-
tral repository of sovereignty in a republic and had critical legal func-
tions in wartime, including the use of summary legal procedures like 
the bill of attainder.  In exercising these functions the assembly was 
not limited to passing general, forward-looking laws—a constraint 
that would be ill-fitted to the nature of the task.  If we try to imagine 
as they would have the different institutional forms sovereignty could 
assume in the prosecution of a civil war and the protection of a state’s 
citizens, we can better understand what was at stake in arguments 
where the Philips case was adduced: the scope of summary proceed-
ings and the integrity of ordinary forms of justice. 
A. Randolph and Henry in the Virginia Ratifying Convention 
Philips’ case made its first reappearance ten years after his execu-
tion, in the convention of Virginia delegates elected to ratify the pro-
posed federal Constitution.76  On June 6, 1788, the fourth day of the 
convention, Governor Edmund Randolph—who had previously been 
clerk of the House of Delegates when Philips was attainted, and then 
Attorney General when Philips was indicted and convicted of rob-
bery—adduced the attainder as an example of the insecurity of indi-
vidual rights.77  The Virginia Constitution of 1776 did not prohibit 
attainders, but section 8 of its Declaration of Rights did guarantee 
that defendants could confront their accusers, compel the production 
of favorable evidence, and have a jury trial.  Randolph then described 
what had occurred for the benefit of the convention: 
A man who was a citizen was deprived of his life, thus—from a 
mere reliance on general reports, a Gentleman in the House of Del-
egates informed the House, that a certain man (Josiah Philips) had 
committed several crimes, and was running at large perpetrating 
other crimes, he therefore moved for leave to attaint him; he ob-
76. See generally VIRGINIA GAZETTE (Dixon & Hunter) (Dec. 4, 1778), p. 2., col. 2. 
77. Id. 
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tained that leave instantly; no sooner did he obtain it, than he drew 
from his pocket a bill ready written for that effect; it was read three 
times in one day, and carried to the Senate: I will not say that it 
passed the same day through the Senate: But he was attainted very 
speedily and precipitately, without any proof better than vague re-
ports! Without being confronted with his accuser and witness; with-
out the privilege of calling for evidence in his behalf, he was 
sentenced to death, and was afterwards actually executed.78 
The account looks startlingly inaccurate. As we know, Philips’ at-
tainder did not pass through the House of Delegates in one day.  Nor 
was Philips deprived of his confrontation or jury trial rights; he was 
indicted for robbery, tried by a jury and convicted. The errors are 
hard to understand, given Randolph’s positions as clerk of the House 
and Attorney General; surely, no one was in a better position than 
Randolph to know what had happened. 
Yet perhaps even more surprising was the response Randolph’s 
description drew from Patrick Henry one day later.  Rather than chal-
lenge Randolph, Henry largely conceded the account. Philips, he 
argued, 
was not executed by a tyrannical stroke of power <nor was he a 
Socrates>. He was a fugitive murderer and an out-law. . . . Those 
who declare war against the human race, may be struck out of exis-
tence as soon as they are apprehended. He was not executed ac-
cording to those beautiful legal ceremonies which are pointed out 
by the laws, in criminal cases. The enormity of his crimes did not 
entitle him to it. I am truly a friend to legal forms and methods; but, 
Sir, the occasion warranted the measure. A pirate, an out-law, or a 
78. 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 972.  Randolph’s speech, as well as the speech of Henry on 
the following day, are taken from DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF 
VIRGINIA 77–78 (1788) [hereinafter DEBATES OF THE  CONVENTION OF  VIRGINIA], the first of 
three volumes compiled from shorthand notes taken by lawyer David Robertson and published 
in October 1788, several months after the convention concluded.  9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 
902. Robertson sat in the galley, id., a seat he described as “remote from the speakers, where he 
was frequently interrupted by the noise made by those who were constantly going out and com-
ing in.” Id. at 905. Robertson could understand certain speakers better than others.  Asked years 
later to describe the accuracy of Robertson’s record, John Marshall commented that “Gov: Ran-
dolph whose elocution was good was pretty well reported,” but that “Mr. Henry was reported 
worst of all,—no reporter could Correctly reporte him.” Id. at 905. George Mason was less san-
guine, but for a different reason, accusing Robertson on multiple occasions of bias as a “federal 
Partizan.” Id. at 904. On Robertson’s reporting, see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEO-
PLE  DEBATE THE  CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 258–59 (2010) (suggesting that hearing, rather 
than bias, was Robertson’s principal problem); MARY  SARAH  BILDER, MADISON’S  HAND: RE-
VISING THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 167 (2015) (“The printed speeches [of the Virginia 
Convention] differed from members’ recollections. . . . [They] remained a product of partial 
memory and generous extrapolation.”). 
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common enemy to all mankind, may be put to death at any time. It 
is justified by the laws of nature and nations.79 
But Philips had not been “struck out of existence” upon being 
apprehended!  He had been given a trial.  Henry’s offhand remark 
that Philips was not “a Socrates” became a Federalist talking point in 
the first half of the convention. Randolph brought it up on June 9, 
John Marshall mentioned it on June 10, George Nicholas discussed it 
that day and then again on June 14 and 16, and Edmund Pendleton, 
president of the convention, discussed the matter on June 12.80  Only 
Benjamin Harrison came to Henry’s defense, cautioning that Philips 
“was a man, who, by the law of nations, was entitled to no privilege of 
trial.”81 
Jefferson made no comment, as he was then in France. 
B. St. George Tucker in Blackstone’s Commentaries 
The Philips attainder slept again. Fifteen years later, in 1803, 
leading Virginia judge St. George Tucker published an annotated ver-
sion of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England, which in-
cluded a clause-by-clause commentary on the federal Constitution. 
Tucker had likely written the notes in the early 1790s for a course on 
law he gave at William and Mary.82  When Tucker came to the prohi-
bition of bills of attainder in article I, sections 9 and 10, he described 
them in no uncertain terms. “Bills of attainder,” Tucker wrote, were 
“state-engines of oppression in the last resort, . . . supply[ing] the want 
of legal forms, legal evidence, and of every other barrier which the 
laws provide against tyranny and injustice in ordinary cases.”83  They 
were evident “in almost every page of English history for a considera-
ble period.” Tucker then turned to the Philips case: 
In May, 1778, an act passed in Virginia, to attaint one Josiah Philips, 
unless he should render himself to justice, within a limited time: he 
was taken, after the time had expired, and was brought before the 
79. 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 1038. DHRC incorporates corrections made by reporter 
Robertson in an 1805 edition of the Debates, which are set off by angle brackets. The 1788 
edition of the Debates omits mention of Socrates from Henry’s speech, but includes a footnote 
in Randolph’s speech of June 9, which reads, “Mr. Henry had said that Philips was not a Socra-
tes.” DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, supra note 78, at 192. 
80. 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 1086, 1116, 1127, 1333; 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1197 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino et al. 
eds., 1993). 
81. 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 1127. 
82. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at viii. 
83. Id. at 292–93. 
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general court to receive sentence of execution pursuant to the direc-
tions of the act. But the court refused to pass the sentence, and he 
was put upon his trial, according to the ordinary course of law . . . . 
This is a decisive proof of the importance of the separation of pow-
ers of government, and of the independence of the judiciary . . . .84 
But how could it be? Philips had, in fact, come in before the end 
of the grace period.  He therefore could not have been executed under 
the act of attainder. Tucker knew several of the judges involved and 
may have discussed the matter with them.85  From where, then, could 
Tucker have gotten the impression that the General Court refused to 
enforce the act? 
C. The Jefferson-Wirt and Jefferson-Girardin Exchanges 
Ten years later, in 1814, Jefferson finally learned of the afterlife of 
the attainder of Josiah Philips. In July, William Wirt wrote Jefferson 
seeking information for a biography of Patrick Henry. Wirt noted that 
Henry had been “much censured by Mr Ed. Randolph” at the 1788 
convention “on account of the attainder of a man by the name of Phil-
lips.”86  Could Jefferson provide any information? Jefferson re-
sponded the next month.  Randolph’s censure of Henry was, he wrote, 
“without foundation.”87 As Jefferson recalled it, Henry had informed 
him of Philips’s doings, and both men thought it best to proceed by 
bill of attainder. When Philips was captured, it was Randolph who de-
cided not to have him executed according to the Act. Randolph be-
lieved Philips “would plead that he was a British subject, taken in 
arms, in support of his lawful sovereign, and as a prisoner of war enti-
tled to the protection of the law of nations.”88  It was “safest” simply 
to indict him for robbery. 
The next spring, in March 1815, Jefferson wrote a much fuller 
account of the affair to Louis Girardin, who was then at work continu-
ing a classic history of Virginia.89  Girardin’s manuscript referred to 
84. Id. at 293. 
85. Trent, supra note 9, at 452 (“The learned judge has long been known . . . as a painstak-
ing writer. Would he have permitted himself to make so important a statement without having 
investigated the subject carefully?”). 
86. Letter from William Wirt to Thomas Jefferson (July 27, 1814), in 7 THE  PAPERS OF 
THOMAS  JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT  SERIES 495 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., Princeton Univ. Press 
2010); see also Trent, supra note 9, at 451. 
87. Writ Letter, 1814, supra note 46, at 548. 
88. Id. at 549. 
89. JOHN BURK, 4 SKELTON JONES & LOUIS HUE GIRARDIN, THE HISTORY OF VIRGINIA: 
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St. George Tucker’s account of the Philips attainder in his now-influ-
ential edition of the Commentaries. Jefferson was critical. “[I]nstead of 
a definition of the functions of bills of attainder,” wrote Jefferson, 
Judge Tucker had “given a diatribe against their abuse.” But bills of 
attainder had “a proper office,” which was to reach fugitives from jus-
tice. “[W]hen a person, charged with a crime, withdraws from justice, 
or resists it by force, either in his own or a foreign country, . . . a 
special act is passed by the legislature, adapted to the particular 
case.”90  Properly formed, such an act should provide the defendant a 
chance to appear, but “declare[ ] that his refusal to appear shall be 
taken as a confession of guilt, . . . and pronounce[ ] the sentence which 
would have been rendered on his confession or conviction in a court 
of law.” The attainder of Philips had taken just this form. He had been 
“too powerful to be arrested by the sheriff and his posse comitatus.” 
Proofs of his wrongdoing “were ample, his outrages as notorious as 
those of the public enemy, and well known to the members of both 
houses from those counties.”  Philips’ alleged service in the English 
cause did not make it unlawful for Virginia to proceed by bill of at-
tainder, since “an enemy in lawful war putting to death, in cold blood, 
the prisoner he has taken, authorizes retaliation, which would be in-
flicted with peculiar justice on the individual guilty of the deed.”  Ran-
dolph had proceeded against him “as a murder & robber” anyway, 
against which Philips “pleaded that he was a British subject, author-
ized to bear arms by a Commission from Ld Dunmore, that he was a 
mere prisoner of war,” but the plea had been rejected and Philips exe-
cuted “according to the forms and rules of the Common law.” Judge 
Tucker was wrong that the judges had refused to enforce the Act. Its 
enforcement was in fact “never proposed to them.”91 
D. Making Sense of Randolph’s Account 
The record raises two central questions. First, why did Randolph 
misrepresent the proceedings against Josiah Philips?92 Or did he, 
90. See Girardin Letter, supra note 8, at 334. 
91. Id. at 334, 336–37.  An examination of the records in the case, suggested Jefferson, 
would be appropriate, as he was “not so certain in my recollection of the details.” Id. at 337; see 
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Wirt (Aug. 5, 1815), in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 643–44 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2011). 
92. Although Crosskey and Eckenrode thought Randolph lied, CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at 
946; ECKENRODE, supra note 9, at 193, Jefferson did not. Writ Letter, 1816, supra note 74, at 438 
(“[N]ot that I consider mr Randolph as misstating intentionally, or desiring to boulster an argu-
ment at the expence of an absent person . . . and as little do I impute to mr Henry any willingness 
to leave on my shoulders a charge which he could so easily have disproved.”). On another occa-
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somehow, forget?  But what, then, of Henry’s response—did Henry 
forget too? Second, why did Tucker claim that the judges of the Vir-
ginia General Court had refused to enforce the act of attainder? 
Whether one took Randolph’s view—that Philips had been “after-
wards actually executed”—or Jefferson’s view (and the view of mod-
ern researchers)—that Philips had been tried by a jury and executed 
for robbery—there was no basis for thinking the case had involved 
judicial review. 
Return, first, to Edmund Randolph’s account of the Philips at-
tainder at the Virginia ratifying convention. A clue to what Randolph 
intended can be found in his History of Virginia, composed between 
1809 and 1813 and for many years available only in manuscript.93 
Randolph’s History refers briefly to the Philips affair, reiterating 
much of what he had alleged at the convention, but with an important 
addition. Here is what Randolph says: 
It was generally believed that a banditti in the neighborhood of 
Norfolk had availed themselves of the cover and aid which a British 
squadron and British forces had lately afforded them for plunder 
and revenge by various atrocities on many citizens. One Josiah 
Philips . . . had eluded every attempt to capture him. . . . [T]he Gen-
eral Assembly, without other evidence than general rumor of his 
guilt, or the insufficiency of legal process in taking him into custody, 
on the motion of a member attainted him of high treason, unless he 
should surrender by a given day. In a very august Assembly of Vir-
ginia, it was contended that, as he deserved to die, it was unimpor-
tant whether he fell according to the technicality of legal proceeding 
or not. Probably he deserved death, although if a judgment can be 
formed of this by subsequent facts, the prosecution against him being 
as against a robber, not a traitor, he was an offender less heinous than 
he was conceived to be. His apology, too, was not perhaps admissi-
ble, although it was that he had never for a moment acquiesced in 
the Revolution . . . and that his loyalty was not for a moment con-
cealed, but he received on the first opportunity, and acted under, a 
military commission from the crown. He did not surrender within 
sion, Jefferson described Randolph as “the poorest cameleon I ever saw, having no colour of his 
own, and reflecting that nearest to him.” EDMUND  RANDOLPH, HISTORY OF  VIRGINIA, at xv 
(Arthur H. Shaffer ed., 1970) (1809–1813) [hereinafter RANDOLPH, HISTORY] (quoting Dice 
Robins Anderson, Edmund Randolph, in 2 THE AMERICAN SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THEIR 
DIPLOMACY 100 (1927)). 
93. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at xxxvii–xliv. The Shaffer edition is the only 
printed version of the History of which I am aware, although parts of it were reproduced in 
various places by individuals who had seen the manuscript. E.g., 1 WILLIAM WIRT HENRY, PAT-
RICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 435 (1891). 
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the time prescribed and was exposed, on being arrested, to the sin-
gle question whether he was the person attainted and upon the es-
tablishment of the affirmative to be led to execution. He waived his 
apology because he would not exasperate his jury in his defense 
against robbery.94 
Randolph’s account in the History clearly demonstrates that he 
was aware Philips was prosecuted for robbery. Randolph regards this 
fact as consistent with his criticism of the attainder—in fact, Philips’s 
prosecution for robbery is part of what bothers Randolph most about 
the affair.  This suggests a different interpretation of Randolph’s 
words at the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788. On that occasion, 
Randolph noted that the House of Delegates had relied on only 
“vague reports” or “general reports,” and that these reports had al-
leged Philips merely to have committed “several crimes.”95 Randolph 
also emphasized the speed with which the bill passed through House, 
which had deprived Philips of an opportunity to appear and defend 
himself before the bill passed.96  These points suggest that Randolph’s 
concern was with the circumstances under which the bill passed, rather 
than the act’s subsequent execution. Indeed, Jefferson himself sug-
gests just this interpretation of Randolph’s words in his letter to Louis 
Girardin. If, wrote Jefferson, “mr Randolph meant only that Philips 
had not these advantages [i.e., confrontation of his accusers and the 
introduction of evidence] on the passage of the bill of Attainder, how 
idle to charge the legislature with omitting to confront the culprit with 
his witnesses, when . . . their sentence was to take effect only on his 
own refusal to come in and be confronted.”97 Moreover, Randolph 
did not, in fact, deny that Philips had been tried.  He stated only that 
the bill had sentenced Philips to death (as it had, conditionally), and 
that Philips was “afterwards actually executed.”98  Both propositions 
were true, so far as we know. 
Nor did Randolph falsely imply that Philips had been executed 
pursuant to the act of attainder. It would have been reckless to at-
tempt such a thing given the convention’s membership. Present there 
were a number of judges and former judges who had served during 
the Philips affair, including John Blair, Paul Carrington, and the doy-
ens of Virginia legal society, George Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, 
94. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at 268–69 (emphasis added). 
95. 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 972. 
96. Id. 
97. Girardin Letter, supra note 8, at 335 (emphasis added). 
98. 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 972. 
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any one of whom might have known of Philips’ fate.99  Their politics 
and purposes were diverse.  Another judge, Joseph Jones, had served 
on the General Court in 1778 and would now vote against the pro-
posed federal Constitution, in opposition to Randolph. James 
Madison knew of the Philips case from his seat on the governor’s 
Privy Council in 1778 and supported the Constitution, but opposed 
Randolph’s desire to amend it.100  Patrick Henry and Benjamin Harri-
son opposed the Constitution unless amended (Henry, likely, even if 
amended), and both had been personally involved in Philips’s attain-
der.  Whether moved by politics or office, any one of these men might 
have undermined Randolph by pointing out a misleading implication. 
His credibility already in question for having switched positions on the 
Constitution (he had refused to sign it at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion), it would have been utterly senseless for Randolph to risk his 
reputation—and ratification—to mischaracterize the case.101 
Assuming they were accurately reported, Henry’s remarks did 
evince a mistaken belief that Philips had been executed pursuant to 
the act of attainder.  Were this the point in dispute, all those present 
with knowledge of Philips’s case would have expected Randolph to 
correct the error, and Randolph would have been aware of such an 
expectation. But it was not the point in dispute. Randolph’s purpose 
in referring to the Philips case was, as he put it, to demonstrate the 
insecurity of “public justice” in Virginia, and for that purpose the bill’s 
passage was the crucial point.102 Randolph dwelled on the circum-
stances under which the bill passed.  He emphasized speed, collusion, 
and that Philips had not been afforded an opportunity to appear and 
defend himself.103  The last point was attractive because it was a clas-
99. Compare 10 DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY OF  RATIFICATION, supra note 80, at 1540–41 
(listing Virginia ratification ‘aye’ and ‘no’ votes), with 2 WILLIAM BROCKENBROUGH, VIRGINIA 
CASES, OR DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA, at x, xiii (1826) (listing members 
of General Court and High Court of Chancery). 
100. Prior to the convention, Madison suspected that Randolph approved of the Constitu-
tion, if amended before ratification; at the convention, however, Randolph urged that amend-
ment should follow ratification. MAIER, supra note 78, at 232, 241, 261. 
101. See id. at 261 (noting that “members of the opposition were not so happy about Ran-
dolph’s stand [in favor of ratification prior to amendment], and periodically in the course of the 
convention they would make comments about Randolph’s inconsistency that provoked brief, 
emotional flare-ups”); see also RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at xiii (similar). 
102. See 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 971 (“Governor Randolph.— . . . The security of public 
justice, Sir, is what I most fervently wish—as I consider that object to be the primary step to the 
attainment of public happiness. . . . We are told that the report of dangers is false. The cry of 
peace, Sir, is false: Say peace when there is peace: It is but a sudden calm. The tempest growls 
over you—look round—wheresoever you look, you see danger.”). 
103. Id. 
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sic objection against bills of attainder, which others were likely to 
know.104 The objection was not usually employed against suspensive 
attainders, however, and Jefferson’s response, quoted above, shows 
why: surely one cannot fault the assembly for proceeding against 
Philips in absentia when the man refused to come in. Yet Randolph 
had a rejoinder to Jefferson, which he described in the History: Should 
a citizen have to bear the risk that he be conditionally sentenced to 
death by the legislature without notice? “What was [Philips’s] peril, 
while he was roving abroad, devoted by a legislature to death unless 
he should surrender himself”?105 And what could Philips have ex-
pected had he come in, given that the “denunciation of a government 
is almost the sure harbinger of condemnation”?106 A jury would be 
biased against a defendant already publicly condemned in the legisla-
ture by the leading men of the state. The rejoinder was especially 
powerful because Philips had been alleged merely to have committed 
“several crimes”—murder, arson and robbery—rather than conduct 
that was unequivocally treason.  Indeed, report of Philips’s trial in the 
Virginia Gazette stated a charge of “robbing the publick waggons”— 
but then added, parenthetically, that his gang “were accused of mur-
der, treason, and sundry other outrages.”107 If serious but ordinary 
crimes were to be summarily prosecuted in the assembly any time ju-
dicial process failed, it risked “confounding” legislative and judicial 
powers and thereby corrupting ordinary forms of justice. That danger 
was not alleviated because Philips had in fact received a trial.108 
This construction of Randolph’s comments provides a key for 
making sense of much of what was said about Philips at the conven-
104. See, e.g., Steilen, supra note 2, at 800–02 (noting the criticism of Elizabeth Barton at-
tainder); id. at 822–23 (discussing the attainder in Coke’s Institutes and “On the Judicature of 
Parliaments”). 
105. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at 269. 
106. Id. Levy makes this point in his discussion of the case, without attributing it to Ran-
dolph. LEVY, supra note 9, at 76. 
107. VIRGINIA  GAZETTE (Purdie) (Oct. 30, 1778), p. 3, col. 2 (“On Friday the 16th com-
menced, and continued to the 21st, the trial of sundry prisoners from the publick jail, when 
Josiah Philips [and others] from Princess Anne for robbing the publick wagons (and who were 
accused of murder, treason and sundry other outrages) were capitally convicted . . . .”). 
108. According to Madison’s notes and the official journal of the Philadelphia convention, 
on August 20, 1787, Randolph had moved to broaden the definition of treason in the draft Con-
stitution to include giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, because they 
“had a more extensive meaning.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
339, 345–46, 351 (Max Farrand ed., 1937); see also 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786–1870, at 569 (1900).  The act of attainder, how-
ever, charged Philips and his gang with having levied war, and thus depended on a theory that 
the use of armed force to resist the execution of law or effect change was treasonous. See supra 
note 55. 
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tion. For if Randolph aimed his attack at the scope of legislative at-
tainder, then Henry would focus his defense there as well.  Henry had 
defended bills of attainder before, as Randolph knew.  During delib-
erations in the 1776 convention that enacted Virginia’s state constitu-
tion, Henry had argued forcefully against language in a draft 
declaration of rights prohibiting bills of attainder, citing cases not un-
like Philips’. According to Randolph’s History, “An article prohibiting 
bills of attainder was defeated by Henry, who with a terrifying picture 
of some towering public offender against whom ordinary laws would 
be impotent, saved that dread power from being expressly pro-
scribed.”109  The guarantee of jury trials and confrontation in (what 
became) section 8 of the Declaration of Rights was objected to on a 
similar basis.110 Henry’s ally, the radical Thomas Ludwell Lee, also 
attempted to qualify a ban on ex post facto laws for this reason, prof-
fering that such rules “were not natural laws, but might be changed by 
posterity as the law of necessity—the exigencies of life—might dic-
tate,” such as “when the safety of the State absolutely requires” that it 
act ex post facto.111 
At the federal convention, twelve years later, Henry found it 
much harder to stake out this position on bills of attainder.  Although 
George Mason had attacked the proposed Constitution for its ban on 
ex post facto laws despite the need for such laws to protect “public 
safety,” Henry said nothing about the neighboring provision banning 
bills of attainder.112 And although slavery played an important role in 
Henry’s arguments during the convention, he made no effort to con-
nect the Philips attainder to the presence of escaped slaves in the gang 
109. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at 255; see also Hilldrup, supra note 52, at 202–03. 
110. Hilldrup, supra note 52, at 193 (reporting that Thomas Ludwell Lee or an ally “tried to 
attach to this section . . . an amendment . . . ‘that no man, except in times of actual invasion or 
insurrection, can be imprisoned upon suspicion of crimes against the States, unsupported by 
legal evidence,’” which Hilldrup views as giving “martial law a constitutional sanction”). 
111. Id. at 183.  In committee, Henry and Lee had lost to the moderate “Tuckahoes,” who 
insisted on such a ban to protect themselves from anti-Tory laws. Id. at 184. The ban, however, 
was rejected by the full convention. 
112. George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Conven-
tion, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 45 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino et al. eds., 1988) (“Both the general Legislature & the State 
Legislatures are expressly prohibited making ex post facto Laws; tho’ there never was or can be 
a Legislature but must & will make such Laws, when Necessity & the public safety require 
them . . . .”). Henry joined Mason in his criticism of the bans on federal and state ex post facto 
laws in Article I, sections 9 and 10, but on the basis that they would require federal and state 
governments to honor deflated paper currencies and debts. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
RATIFICATION, supra note 80, at 1346–47, 1354, 1356–58. 
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and the dangers of slave insurrection.113 Instead, Henry opened the 
convention by arguing that the proposed federal Constitution would 
deprive Virginians of the liberties they now enjoyed.114 The tactic 
made the Philips case awkward, since Philips had at least been 
threatened with a denial of the right to a jury trial. Henry’s strategy 
was to argue that Philips was never entitled to the procedure; the leg-
islature could proceed as it did, Henry argued, because Philips was a 
“fugitive” and an “out-law,” a “common enemy to all mankind.” As 
the speech unwound, however, Henry lost his grip on the argument, as 
listeners misunderstood the observation about Socrates, whom Henry 
adduced not as an example of a virtuous man, but as someone unjustly 
condemned and executed (ironically, by a jury). Philips, in contrast, 
had been given a fugitive’s due.  Delegates missed the point, and when 
Henry concluded that Philips’ treatment was justified by the “laws of 
nature and nations,” they heard confirmation of a view that the unvir-
tuous might be deprived of trial by jury.115 Federalists sensed a mis-
step and seized upon it. 
So, why, then, did Randolph misrepresent what had happened to 
Philips?  The answer is that he did not—at least, not where it counted. 
Randolph was guilty of exaggerating the speed with which the bill 
passed through the house.  He was also mistaken that Philips had been 
captured after the grace period in the act expired. And he was less 
than fully forthright in failing to correct Henry’s assertion that Philips 
had not enjoyed a jury trial, although he probably remained well 
within the conventions and mutual expectations that characterized 
113. See Robin L. Einhorn, Patrick Henry’s Case Against the Constitution: The Structural 
Problem with Slavery, 22 J. EARLY  REPUB. 549, 549–55 (2002) (discussing Henry’s speech of 
June 24). Randolph broached the issue of slave insurrections early in the convention. MAIER, 
supra note 78, at 274. 
114. See 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 930 (“[Patrick Henry:] I expected to have heard the 
reasons of an event [i.e., the proposal of the Constitution] so unexpected to my mind, and many 
others. Was our civil polity, or public justice, endangered or sapped? . . . This proposal of altering 
our Federal Government is of a most alarming nature . . . you ought to be extremely cautious, 
watchful, jealous of your liberty; for instead of securing your rights, you may lose them for-
ever.”). When Randolph and Pendleton responded that Virginia was suffering from economic 
depression, Henry chided them, “You are not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor 
how you are to become a great and powerful people, but how your liberties can be secured.” Id. 
at 951–52 (emphasis added).  For Randolph and Pendleton’s comments, see id. at 934, 944.  Ac-
cording to Pauline Maier, Henry’s argument that “[t]he people were secure before the Constitu-
tional Convention met” “effectively redefined the questions for debate,” and “forced [the 
convention] to confront big questions that were not on its formal agenda.” MAIER, supra note 
78, at 260, 257. 
115. See 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 1038. 
440 [VOL. 60:413 
 
 
The Josiah Philips Attainder 
convention discourse.116  For Philips’ trial was not Randolph’s con-
cern. Randolph’s concern was that a bill of attainder had passed 
merely on the basis of reports that Philips led a gang engaged in mur-
der, arson and robbery, without offering Philips an opportunity to ap-
pear and defend himself. This was true, and it supported Randolph’s 
contention that civil justice was insecure in Virginia. If the assembly 
could interfere in judicial forms of process merely because it was war-
time, then section 8 of the state’s admirable Declaration of Rights 
would not be enough to protect Virginians’ liberties. And it was at 
this proposition, naturally, that Patrick Henry aimed his response. The 
Philips case did not evidence a failure of justice, Henry argued, since 
everyone had known that Philips was not entitled to the protections of 
the common law.  Swept up by his own argument, perhaps, Henry mis-
handled the point—a result that apparently was not uncommon for 
the great orator.117 
If I am right about this, it follows that Henry, Jefferson and even 
Randolph regarded the General Assembly as possessing significant le-
gal powers. Their dispute was about the scope of these powers. This 
reinforces a reading of section 5 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
which famously provided for a separation of powers, as intended 
merely to secure some autonomy for Virginia courts, rather than con-
fine the assembly to a legislative ‘function’—passing general, forward-
looking laws.118 Indeed, from one perspective, it was essential that a 
republican assembly have the authority to cure failures in justice 
caused by a breakdown in judicial process. In appropriate cases, 
where the security of the whole people was at risk, the assembly might 
116. Cf. Jack Rakove, A Biography of Madison’s Notes of Debates, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 
(forthcoming) (reviewing BILDER, supra note 78) (identifying, among “the rhetorical conven-
tions that operated during the ratification conventions,” the conversion of “‘the complicated 
political process into the thoughts of a single mind’”). 
117. Girardin Letter, supra note 8, at 335 (“[Henry] must have known that Philips was tried 
and executed under the Common Law, and yet, according to this report, he rests his defence on 
a justification of attainder only. [B]ut all who knew mr Henry know that when at ease in argu-
ment, he was sometimes careless, not giving himself the trouble of ransacking either his memory 
or imagination for all the topics of his subject, or his audience that of hearing them.”). We should 
not conclude, I think, that Randolph knowingly took advantage of Henry in this regard, given 
the membership of the convention and the risk of having a misleading statement be openly 
corrected. 
118. Declaration of Rights, supra note 20, at 1920 (“Sect. 5. That the legislative and executive 
powers of the State should be separate and distinct from the judiciary”); see also ADAMS, supra 
note 20, at 265 (“Virginia’s constitution of June 1776 was the first constitutional document since 
the Instrument of Government . . . to include the principle of separation of powers in express 
terms. It did so with a clarity that no previous statement of either theory or practice had 
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suspend the law in favor of summary or military proceedings, guided 
by the expertise of elite lawyers sitting there.119  This was one way in 
which the representative assembly, and not the governor, inherited 
the king’s obligations to protect his subjects and provide justice.120  In 
Jefferson’s mind, at least, such an allocation was preferable to vesting 
the authority in common-law courts, since judicial innovation was in-
consistent with republican government, even where judges improvised 
on a long-established judicial writ like outlawry.121 
III. ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND THE ROLE OF COURTS 
IN WARTIME GOVERNANCE 
Jefferson saw an expansive role for the General Assembly in Vir-
ginia’s republican government, but even he would later admit that it 
did not prove equal to the task.  It was prone to the same corruption 
that had compromised Virginia’s colonial government.122  The state’s 
constitution was of no avail in this regard; as Jefferson complained in 
Notes on the State of Virginia, it was “no alleviation” to the threat of 
despotism that powers had been placed “in a plurality of hands,” as 
guaranteed by section 5 of the Declaration of Rights, since the Assem-
bly had absorbed “[a]ll the powers of government, legislative, execu-
tive and judiciary,” inserting itself even into the ordinary course of 
justice.123 Over the course of the 1780s, then, some Virginians began 
to envision a shift in the institutional forms of magistracy. The Gen-
eral Assembly would have to be bound by “well-designed legal mech-
anisms.”124 One such mechanism was a stronger national authority; 
119. Section 7 of the Declaration of Rights requires the consent of the “representatives of the 
people” to suspend laws. Declaration of Rights, supra note 20, at 1920. Jefferson clearly thought 
the assembly should have a power to attaint.  In addition to his Bill to Attaint Josiah Philips, see 
Jefferson’s proposed “Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capi-
tal,” probably written in late 1778, which provides that “No attainder shall work corruption of 
blood in any case.” Bill to Attaint, supra note 1, at 503, 506–07 n.21. 
120. Matthew Crow, Thomas Jefferson and the Uses of Equity, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 153, 
168–69 (2015). 
121. A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL  MAGISTRATES AND  REPUBLICAN  LAWYERS: CREATORS OF 
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680–1810, at 163–67 (1981); David Thomas Konig, Legal Fictions 
and the Rule(s) of Law: The Jeffersonian Critique of Common-Law Adjudication, in THE MANY 
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 114–17 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001). 
122. COLBOURN, supra note 58, at 172–73. 
123. THOMAS  JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE  STATE OF  VIRGINIA 123–24 (1785).  That the as-
sembly interfered with the ordinary course of justice is how I understand the famous complaint 
that the Assembly had “in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judici-
ary controversy.” Id. at 124. 
124. Gerald Leonard, Jefferson’s Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CLASSICS: PAT-
TERNS OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  THOUGHT FROM  FORTESCUE TO  BENTHAM 378 (Denis J. Galligan 
ed., 2014).  Compare Leonard’s account with Mary Sarah Bilder’s account of Jefferson’s thinking 
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but another was the court of law, now inoculated against executive 
interference by a doctrine of ‘judicial independence,’ and improved by 
statutory reform and by the spread of common-law procedures.125 
This is the context in which we must take up St. George Tucker’s 
suggestion, in his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, that Vir-
ginia’s judges refused to enforce the act of attainder against Josiah 
Philips. Tucker was a member of the great planter class by marriage, 
but had found commercial success and reputation largely as a lawyer 
practicing before Virginia’s central courts in the 1780s.126  He became 
an early and vigorous proponent of employing the state’s courts as a 
‘legal mechanism’ for checking the General Assembly. Tucker had 
taken this position as early as 1782 (around the same time Jefferson 
was writing Notes), in his argument as an amicus in another treason 
prosecution, known to us as Commonwealth v. Caton.127  In Caton, 
the question was whether a provision governing pardons in Virginia’s 
Treason Act was consistent with the pardon clause in the state’s 1776 
Constitution; and, if the former was “repugnant” to the latter, whether 
the Court of Appeals could declare the act void.128  Tucker took the 
second question first and argued straightaway that the court must 
have such an authority, concomitant to its power “to explain the Laws 
of the Land as they apply to particular Cases.”129 Moreover, this 
power was the courts’ alone. For if the General Assembly, too, could 
“explain the Laws judicially, that is to decide in particular Cases,” then 
in the late 1780s: “Jefferson returned [to the United States in 1789 from France] with views 
framed by the aspirations and anxieties of the French Revolution instead of firsthand experience 
with American political changes . . . .  For Jefferson, danger lay with would-be monarchists rather 
than state governments. Salvation lay with republican government rather than national or fed-
eral government.” BILDER, supra note 78, at 203. As I read Jefferson, the danger, and thus 
salvation, lay with both. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 396 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (“It might be indeed if every 
form of government were so perfectly contrived that the will of the majority could always be 
obtained fairly and without impediment.  But this is true of no form. The people cannot assem-
ble themselves.  Their representation is unequal and vicious. . . . Factions get possession of the 
public councils. Bribery corrupts them. Personal interests lead them astray from the general 
interests of their constituents . . . .”), cited in BILDER, supra note 78, at 320 n.2. 
125. ROEBER, supra note 121, at 161, 197; F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VER-
SUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA’S PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783–1828, at 12–33 (1994). 
126. TAYLOR, INTERNAL ENEMY, supra note 38, at 32. 
127. Argument in the Case of the Prisoners (Oct. 31, 1782), in 3 ST. GEORGE TUCKER’S LAW 
REPORTS AND SELECTED PAPERS, 1782–1825, at 1741–48 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2013); William 
Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 491, 520–29 (1994). 
128. Pendleton’s Account of “The Case of the Prisoners” (Caton v. Commonwealth), in  2 
THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734–1803, at 416–17 (David John Mays 
ed., 1967); Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5 (1782). 
129. Argument in the Case of the Prisoners, supra note 127, at 1742. 
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“the Judiciary, who are by the Constitution appointed as a counter-
poise to it [i.e., the assembly], is entirely annulled.”130  Here Tucker 
seems to have been responding to Edmund Randolph, also appearing 
in the case as the state’s Attorney General.  Randolph had agreed that 
a law repugnant to the constitution was void, but not that a court of 
law could declare it void.  In other words, he had opposed judicial 
review.  In correspondence to friends, Randolph suggested that the 
people themselves might resolve the validity of the Treason Act, and 
that a different institution—a council of revision—could enforce the 
constitution in the future.131 
From an early date, then, Tucker saw a constitutional role for 
courts of law as a check on the republican assembly, and in this regard 
he was distinguished from Randolph. But how might the General 
Court have checked the General Assembly in the Philips case? It is 
perfectly possible, as Dumas Malone suggested years ago, that Ed-
mund Randolph—who, recall, was also Attorney General when 
Philips was captured—decided to prosecute Philips for robbery after 
130. Id. 
131. Edmund Randolph, Notes on Virginia Laws. Includes Pardons for Traitors., LIBRARY 
OF  CONG., https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm021836 (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (“That, howsoever 
adverse the law, which vests this power in the general assembly may be, to the constitution, no 
court of judicature can pronounce its nullity.”).  My interpretation of Randolph’s argument dif-
fers markedly from William Treanor’s.  I am indebted here in more than the usual degree to Rob 
Steinfeld, who pointed out to me that Treanor conflates two questions Randolph clearly sepa-
rates in his notes: “1. [whether] the treason law [should] be declared void, so far as it is repug-
nant to the constitution,” and “2. If it can be declared void, can any court of judicature 
pronounce its nullity?” Treanor, supra note 127, at 511. Treanor treats the first question as 
equivalent to judicial review, but I don’t think the reading can be sustained.  Randolph describes 
his answer to the first question as “the decision of my own mind” as to when “the right of 
resistance commences.” Id. at 512.  The reference here seems to be to popular resistance to 
unconstitutional laws, that is, enforcement ‘out of doors,’ rather than in a court of law.  Moreo-
ver, the reporter Daniel Call records Randolph as arguing against judicial review.  Common-
wealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5, 7 (1782) (“The attorney general, in reply, insisted . . . that the court 
were not authorized to declare it [the Treason Act] void.”).  Treanor suggests that Call is in error 
and that the portion of Randolph’s notes stating an opposition to judicial review describe the 
state’s ‘official’ position, to which Randolph was personally opposed. Treanor, supra note 127, at 
511. Yet there is little reason for such gymnastics other than Treanor’s identification of Ran-
dolph’s first and second questions, and for that identification I can find little justification in the 
text itself. Randolph did support judicial review five years later at the Philadelphia Convention, 
but as a supplement to a council of revision.  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 21, 28 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (Madison and Paterson notes of Randolph’s ‘Virginia’ 
Plan); DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 108, at 19 (Madison).  In the weeks before the argu-
ment in Caton, Randolph had written to James Madison that there was talk of creating a “coun-
cil of revision,” comprising in part members of the assembly, in order to “to keep the legislature 
in future cases within its just limits.”  Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 26, 
1782), Manuscript/Mixed Material, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm012317. 




The Josiah Philips Attainder 
consulting with the judges of the General Court.132  Jefferson later de-
nied that the judges had refused to enforce the act, but a consultation 
would have been ambiguous, and we should not be surprised if Jeffer-
son, writing to Wirt in 1815, was prone to emphasize the executive 
discretion it implied, while Tucker in the early 1790s saw the stricter 
logic of judicial duty.  Perhaps, then, the judges expressed an objec-
tion to the act of attainder in some way, leading Randolph to prose-
cute Philips for robbery. But why would the judges have objected? 
How was the act of attainder relevant? If Philips was captured before 
the expiration of the grace period in the attainder, why should Ran-
dolph have sought out their views on it? 
The answer to this question has to do with the boundaries be-
tween the law of war and the law of treason. Jefferson’s bill of attain-
der charged Philips with having “levied war against this 
Commonwealth” by committing murder, arson and robbery. It condi-
tionally attainted him of “high treason,” of course—but it also func-
tioned as an indictment, ordering Philips and his gang to surrender for 
“their trials for the treasons, murders and other felonies” they had 
committed.133  High treason, however, could only be committed by an 
individual who owed allegiance to the sovereign.134 At its core, wrote 
Blackstone in 1769, high treason was a crime that amounts “either to a 
total renunciation of that allegiance, or at the least to a criminal neg-
lect of that duty, which is due from every subject to his sovereign.”135 
American courts of law could enforce this principle consistent with 
their place in a republican form of government, ensuring that assem-
132. DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 292 (1948); cf. 
Trent, supra note 9, at 453 (similar suggestion, but under the assumption that Philips was cap-
tured after the grace period had expired).  Much later, when Randolph served as United States 
Attorney General, he described for French Ambassador Edmond Genet his decision not to pros-
ecute Chief Justice John Jay, as Genet had requested: “I do not hold myself bound, nor do I 
conceive that I ought, to proceed against any man in opposition to my decided judgment.” Letter 
from Edmund Randolph to Edmond Genet, (Dec. 18, 1793), quoted in CASTO, SUPREME COURT, 
supra note 210, 137–38. 
133. Bill to Attaint, supra note 1, at 190; c.3, 9 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 1, at 464. The 
editor of Jefferson’s papers, Julian Boyd, identified a grammatical error in Jefferson’s draft bill, 
which orders Philips and his associates to turn themselves in “in order to their trials for the 
treasons, murders and other felonies.” Boyd suggests that Jefferson omitted the word “stand.” 
Bill to Attaint, supra note 1, at 193 n.6.  Yet the same usage appears in the act of attainder, and as 
Michael Boucai has pointed out to me, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “in order to” as 
“with a view to the bringing about of (something), for the purpose of (some desired end).” OED 
ONLINE (“order”) (Aug. 2016). 
134. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 4–5, 
10–11 (1817) (1644); Calvin’s Case (K.B. 1608), in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD 
COKE: THE REPORTS 166, 174–227 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
135. 4 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 74. 
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blies respected the law of nations while playing an active role in pro-
tecting the operations of government and preserving domestic 
peace.136 
A. The Problem of Allegiance 
The leaders of American assemblies understood the legal connec-
tions between treason and allegiance. When assemblies sought to es-
tablish independent state governments in 1776 and 1777, one of the 
first acts or ordinances they passed was one defining treason and 
describing who owed the state allegiance.137  Virginia addressed trea-
son and allegiance in two separate acts of assembly. The Treason Act 
(the one litigated in Caton) was passed in October 1776, but it was not 
until May 1777 that the General Assembly addressed the matter of 
allegiance, obligating “all free born male inhabitants of this state, 
above the age of sixteen years” to swear an oath of allegiance before a 
justice of the peace.138  The latter act began by reciting that “alle-
giance and protection are reciprocal,”139 which was a standard view, 
but which concealed a difficult problem in this case, explaining why 
allegiance was joined to a compulsory oath. The problem was this: if 
allegiance followed from protection, then someone whom the state 
had never protected could not owe the state allegiance. This might be 
thought to describe Josiah Philips; after all, he had been attainted by 
act because he resided in an ungoverned area (the “Dismal Swamp”), 
where the state was unable to execute the law and judicial process did 
not run. This meant that a court of law trying Philips for treason 
would have to determine whether he was even capable of the crime. 
Three years later, in 1781, this very issue came before the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania in Respublica v. Chapman.140  There the defen-
dant challenged his attainder for treason by the state’s Supreme Exec-
utive Council on grounds that he had not owed the state allegiance at 
the time he joined the enemy in December 1776. On that date the 
state had not yet enacted a constitution or formed a regular govern-
136. See CASTO, supra note 26, at 45–46, 126–41, 146, 159–60; GOEBEL, supra note 26, at 
623–33. 
137. One can find the relevant citations in CHAPIN, supra note 25, at 36–41. 
138. 9 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 1, at 168 (“An act declaring what shall be Treason.”); 
id. at 281 (“An act to oblige the free male inhabitants of this state above a certain age to give 
assurance of Allegiance to the same, and for other purposes.”). 
139. Id. 
140. Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. 53 (Pa. 1781); REPORTS OF  CASES  RULED AND  AD-
JUDGED IN THE COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA, BEFORE AND SINCE THE REVOLUTION 53 (1790). 
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ment. Still, wrote Chief Justice Thomas McKean, “there did antece-
dently exist a power competent to redress grievances, to afford 
protection, and, generally, to execute the laws,” administered by coun-
cil and convention, to which allegiance was due.141 The same issue 
stood at the center of the Philips case, and in this respect his capture 
before the end of the grace period in the act of attainder was 
irrelevant. 
But the problem was not limited to cases like Chapman’s and 
Philips’s. The difficulties posed by allegiance were, in fact, wide-
spread.  Prosecution for lesser state crimes, such as the myriad “trea-
sonous misdemeanors” concocted by state legislatures, also raised the 
question of allegiance.142  In Virginia, for example, shortly after enact-
ing its treason law, the General Assembly passed “An Act for the 
punishment of certain offences,” defining a variety of offenses short of 
treason, including seditious libel, exciting the people to resist govern-
ment, discouraging enlistment, and other offenses.143 These crimes, 
which Blackstone had called “contempts . . . against the king’s person 
and government,” could also be regulated on a preventive basis, under 
a regime of “preventive justice.”144 And, indeed, preventive regula-
tion of sedition and treasonous misdemeanor was common during the 
Revolution, forming perhaps the mainstay of what Willard Hurst has 
described as the “[s]ummary executive action” so typical of the 
time.145 
The absence of allegiance was thus a natural defensive plea 
against charges of treason and related offenses. Aware of this, Attor-
141. Id. at 57.  McKean nevertheless went on to instruct the jury that the state’s treason law 
implied a period of election in which individuals were free to join either side, and Chapman was 
discharged.  Recognizing a period of free election was, says Chapin, an “act of grace,” but states 
generally recognized such a period, concluding in the passage of a treason law. CHAPIN, supra 
note 25, at 71–72. 
142. Young, supra note 25, at 296; see also VAN  TYNE, supra note 25 (providing the best 
study of these offenses in the context of the Revolution). 
143. An act for the punishment of certain offenses, c.5, 9 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 1, 
at 170–71.  The act was repealed and replaced by a similar statute in May 1780.  An act affixing 
penalties to certain crimes injurious to the independence of America, but less than treason, and 
repealing the act for the punishment of certain offenses, c.14, 10 THE  STATUTES AT  LARGE; 
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 268–70 (William Waller Hening ed., 1822). 
144. 3 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S  COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 251. On the ideology of 
police offenses and preventive justice, see MARKUS DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY 
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 83–85 (2005). 
145. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (1945). To 
be sure, publicists described a similar principle under the law of war. Thus, according to Vattel, a 
nation at war could demand good behavior of unarmed enemies, disarming or even imprisoning 
those whom were not trusted. VATTEL, supra note 24, bk.III, c.VIII, §§ 147, at 353. 
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ney General Randolph would have had good reason to seek out the 
views of the General Court on the issue of Philips’s allegiance. The 
judges, for their own part, might reasonably have expected that issue 
to come before them.  Not only was it raised by the language of the 
act of attainder, which directed Philips’s trial for treason, but such 
questions had come before English courts in a variety of postures for 
over 100 years, as evidenced by a variety of authorities they knew, 
including Calvin’s Case.146 If Randolph did inquire into the view of 
the judges of the General Court and discovered they harbored serious 
objections, he may have concluded that it was best not to proceed 
under the act of attainder at all, but bring a new indictment for a fel-
ony like robbery, which still carried a death sentence. This would ac-
count for both Jefferson’s recollection that Randolph had declined to 
prosecute under the act, and Tucker’s statement that the judges had 
refused to do so. As historian Henry Young has shown, it was the 
same path followed by state attorneys in Pennsylvania, tasked with 
prosecuting loyalists who had “operated as uninstructed guerrillas, 
rendering themselves liable to prosecution for nearly every felony.”147 
B. The Problem of Belligerent Status 
Philips had grounds for a second defensive plea as well, namely, 
that he was an enemy belligerent and entitled to protection under the 
customary law of war.  Indeed, references to Philips’s status under the 
law of war and the law of nations litter the record. When Patrick 
Henry first addressed the attainder at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion in 1788, he suggested that Philips’s treatment was justified by the 
law of nations.148  Randolph picked up on the point in his response to 
Henry two days later, pointing out that Philips “had a commission in 
his pocket” when he was arrested, making him “therefore only a pris-
oner of war.”149 Marshall and Nicholas missed the issue in their com-
ments, but Benjamin Harrison—who had been speaker of the House 
of Delegates when the bill of attainder passed—did address it, assert-
ing that Philips “by the law of nations, was entitled to no privilege of 
trial.”150  Everyone with personal knowledge of the matter brought up 
146. PAUL  HALLIDAY, HABEAS  CORPUS: FROM  ENGLAND TO  EMPIRE 32, 162–73, 205–06 
(2010). 
147. Young, supra note 25, at 296–98. 
148. 9 DHRC, supra note 57, at 1038. 
149. Id. at 1087. 
150. Id. at 1127. 
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Philips’s status under the law of war. It figured centrally as well in 
Jefferson’s subsequent recollections of the case. In his first account, 
given to Wirt in August 1814, Jefferson noted that Philips had been 
“covering himself, without authority, under the name of a British sub-
ject,” and that Randolph believed Philips would enter such a plea 
against the attainder, arguing that he was “a prisoner of war entitled 
the protection of the law of nations.”151 He used similar language in a 
letter to Girardin the next year.152 And Randolph’s History, written 
around the same time, asserted that Philips’ “apology” to the charges 
against him was that “he had never for a moment acquiesced in the 
Revolution . . . but he received on the first opportunity, and acted 
under, a military commission from the crown.”153 
If Philips had accepted a military commission from the crown “on 
the first opportunity,” as Randolph stated, and had done so before he 
owed allegiance to Virginia, then it likely made him an enemy.154  An 
enemy could not commit treason.155  Moreover, a central commitment 
of the publicist tradition was that a captured enemy should be held as 
a prisoner of war, and could not be put to death or otherwise pun-
ished.156 At the Virginia ratifying convention, Henry had raised this 
cluster of issues by describing Philips as “[a] pirate, an out-law, or a 
common enemy to all mankind.”157 Henry’s language followed the 
Commentaries, where Blackstone had described a “crime of piracy” 
against the law of nations. The pirate, wrote Blackstone, “has re-
nounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced 
151. Wirt Letter, 1814, supra note 46, at 548–49. 
152. Girardin Letter, supra note 8, at 337 (“[Philips] pleaded that he was a British subject, 
authorized to bear arms by a Commission from Ld Dunmore, that he was therefore a mere 
prisoner of war, and under the protection of the law of nations.”) (“I recommend an examina-
tion of the records . . . I am not sure of . . . whether his plea of alien enemy was formally put in 
and overruled.”). 
153. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at 268–69. 
154. This was the conclusion reached by Chief Justice Thomas McKean in an advisory opin-
ion for President Reed of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council. Letter or Opinion of C. J. 
McKean to Pres. Reed, 1779, 7 PENN. ARCH., 1ST SER. 644–46 (1853). 
155. See COKE, supra note 134, at 10–11; 4 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra 
note 6, at 74–75. 
156. See VATTEL, supra note 24, bk.III, c.vIII, ss.140, 149, at 358– 59; see also HUGO GRO-
TIUS, DE IURE BELLI AC PACIS, Liber III, Caput XIV 522 (1646) (stating that prisoners of war 
who surrender on condition of their safety are not to be put to death)  (“Easdem ob causas vitam 
salvam paciscentium, sive in praelio, sive in obsidione non repudianda dedito.”).  On the publi-
cist tradition and the treatment of prisoners, see generally KENT, supra note 24, Lec.V, at 88–89 
(focusing on the publicist tradition and the treatment of prisoners); NEFF, supra note 24, at 
147–51, 163–65, 194–98 (highlighting the theory of ‘regular war’ more generally); WITT, supra 
note 24, at 16–19. 
157. 9 DHRC, supra note 78, at 1038. 
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himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against 
all mankind.”158 Society could, in self-defense, kill the pirate or out-
law, and states had created summary procedures for dealing with such 
cases.  It was this label, then—pirate—that Randolph sought to rebut 
by raising the issue of the military commission. If Philips had pos-
sessed a military commission, as was rumored, then he was likely not a 
pirate, but a belligerent following British orders.159 
Jefferson was not present at the convention to hear this exchange 
between Henry and Randolph, but he seems to have perceived the 
issue, arguing in his letter to Girardin that the existence of a military 
commission was beside the point. Even if Philips had been commis-
sioned, wrote Jefferson, “an enemy in lawful war putting to death, in 
cold blood, the prisoner he has taken, authorizes retaliation, which 
would be inflicted with peculiar justice on the individual guilty of the 
deed, were it to happen that he should be taken.”160 Jefferson may 
have been referring to Vattel’s The Law of Nations, a work he had 
closely studied, which described “a kind of retaliation sometimes prac-
ticed in war, under the name of reprisals.”  Reprisals were a danger-
ous business; according to the practice, the sovereign might respond to 
an enemy’s killing of innocent prisoners by “hang[ing] an equal num-
ber of his [i.e., the enemy’s] people . . . [and] notifying him that we will 
continue thus to retaliate, for the purpose of obliging him to observe 
the laws of war.”161  Yet Jefferson, apparently, found the idea compel-
ling, or at least its logic difficult to resist, as he followed something 
like this course as Governor of Virginia in combating British-led “In-
dian warfare” in the western territories.162 Jefferson connected the 
158. 4 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES supra note 6, at 71. 
159. See VATTEL, supra note 24, bk.III, c.XV, at 403–05 (“The generals, officers, soldiers, 
privateersmen, and partisans, being all commissioned by the sovereign, make war by virtue of a 
particular order. . . . [I]t is an infamous proceeding . . . to take out commissions from a prince, in 
order to commit piratical depredations on a nation which is perfectly innocent with respect to 
them. The thirst of gold is their only inducement; nor can the commission they have received 
efface the infamy of their conduct, though it screens them from punishment.”) (emphasis added). 
I understand Vattel to be acknowledging that a commission might be used as ‘cover’ for piratical 
activity, not as authority for it; see also KENT, supra note 24, Lec.V, at 91 (according to Kent, 
citing Vattel, even an uncommissioned pirate could not be punished). 
160. Girardin Letter, supra note 8, at 337. 
161. VATTEL, supra note 24, bk.III, c.VIII, at 359. 
162. See WITT, supra note 24, at 28–29, 33–37; see also 9 DHRC, supra note 78, at 1038 
(stating that Jefferson was not the only of our figures to invoke such limitations. Patrick Henry, 
too, argued that, under the law of nations, Philips’s conduct exempted him from protection as a 
prisoner of war, due to “the enormity of his crimes.”); id. at 1127 (acknowledging that Benjamin 
Harrison also shared their views.  Harrison had commented that Philips was “a man, who, by the 
law of nations, was entitled to no privilege of trial.”); VATTEL, supra note 24, bk.III, c.VIII, 
§ 141, at 358 (“There is, however, one case, in which we may refuse to spare the life of an enemy 
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conduct of these “merciless Indian savages” on the western frontier to 
escaped slaves in the eastern Tidewater—slaves like those who had 
joined the Philips gang—and the analogy resounded deeply in 
Virginia.163 
The legal issues here are clearly quite complex, but (fortunately) 
we have no immediate need to referee them.  Whether or not one 
accepts Jefferson’s argument, it is easy to see that Philips’s status en-
gendered serious difficulties for a treason prosecution, since a pris-
oner of war could not normally be tried for treason.164  If Randolph 
consulted the judges of Virginia’s General Court on this point, they 
may have expressed their view that the law of nations forbade a trial 
of Philips for treason, as ordered by the act of attainder—a use of the 
law of nations not unlike the one James Duane would make in the 
later case of Rutgers v. Waddington.165 The issue was one the General 
Court was certainly competent to consider; King’s Bench in England 
had long determined prisoner of war status on petitions for writ of 
habeas corpus, and had even discharged enemy aliens charged with 
treason.166  Randolph may have discovered that the judges would be 
amenable to hearing charges of robbery.  Against robbery, a defensive 
who surrenders . . . . It is when that enemy has been guilty of some enormous breach of the law 
of nations, and particularly when he has violated the laws of war”). 
163. See DECLARATION OF  INDEPENDENCE (1776) (“He has excited domestic insurrections 
amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless 
Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes 
and conditions.”) (emphases added); PAULINE  MAIER, AMERICAN  SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE 
DECLARATION OF  INDEPENDENCE 79, 121 (1997); see also TAYLOR, INTERNAL  ENEMY supra 
note 38, at 10 (discussing the parallel between Indian warfare and slave revolt in Virginia) (“In 
newspapers and pamphlets, American writers demonized the British as race traitors who allied 
with savage Indians on the frontier and fomented bloody slave uprisings in the South.  By aiming 
and encouraging the supposedly barbaric red and black peoples, the British betrayed the white 
Americans, who claimed a unique capacity to enjoy freedom and sustain a republic.”); MAR-
STON, supra note 21, at 55. On Americans’ use of Vattel and the theory of regular war to normal-
ize violent conflict in the project of state building, see Ian Hunter, ‘A Jus gentium for America’: 
The Rules of War and the Rule of Law in the Revolutionary United States, 14 J. HIST. INT’L L. 
173, 178–91 (2012). 
164. HALLIDAY, supra note 146, at 172–73 (describing describes one exception to the bar on 
trying prisoners of war for treason. In captivity, a prisoner of war became a ‘local subject’ of the 
sovereign, and could be tried for treason or felony for conduct after assuming that status). 
165. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor’s Ct. N.Y. 1784), in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF 
ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 414–18 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964) (discussing that the court gave 
force to the law of nations as part of the common law of the New York, effectively vindicating 
national treaty commitments); cf. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (1784) (McKean, 
C.J.) (describing the law of nations as part of the “municipal law” of Pennsylvania) (highlighting 
a similar case decided around the same time, but involving principles of substantive law). On the 
De Longchamps affair and the subsequent prosecution, see CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 
26, at 7–8, 132–33. 
166. HALLIDAY, supra note 146, at 170. 
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plea that Philips was an enemy belligerent was unlikely to succeed, 
since belligerents were supposed to preserve the lives and property of 
unarmed civilians.167 
We should be able to see now why Randolph was so critical of the 
passage of the bill of attainder against Philips, despite the fact that it 
was suspensive in form.  The case clearly involved complex factual and 
legal questions, several of which were contested. Was Philips a British 
subject? Did he have a military commission? Did that commission 
predate his obligation of allegiance to Virginia? Did Philips forfeit his 
right to protection as a prisoner of war by his treatment of civilians? 
The General Assembly had offered Philips no opportunity to appear 
and contest these issues before the bill passed.  And after it passed, he 
could have far less hope to press a jury to his side. We should be able 
to see, as well, the rationale for courts refusing to enforce such acts, as 
envisioned by St. George Tucker.168  In the case of a suspensive attain-
der for treason, the rationale did not turn on when Philips had been 
captured, and this explains why everyone involved failed to recollect 
the point—it did not matter. 
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL FORMS OF LAW 
IN CIVIL CONFLICT 
The terms of dispute about Philips’s attainder capture an evolu-
tion in the role of the assembly in the last decades of the eighteenth 
century; and the confusion this change could trigger when assembly 
procedures or powers were contested.  Writing in July of 1776, Massa-
chusetts lawyer and Yale graduate Joseph Hawley had described at-
tainder in traditional terms, suggesting that “high treason ought to be 
167. VATTEL, supra note 24, at 362; see also KENT, supra note 24, at 87 (discussing additional 
defenses of this position, with some citations to publicist literature); WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 
1212, 1215 (“[I]t is forbidden by the usage of civilized nations, and is a crime against the modern 
law of war, to take the lives of, or commit violence against, non-combatants and private individu-
als not in arms . . . . As to [private property], the strict war right of seizure has been very 
materially qualified by modern usage. Private property . . . is now in general regarded as prop-
erly exempt from seizure except where suitable for military use or of a hostile character.”).  As I 
understand it, the General Court would not have heard prosecution for this offense under the 
law of war; the point is, rather, that such an offense would have made it unlikely that a jury 
would accept a plea of enemy status as a defense to the civil crime of robbery. 
168. TAYLOR, INTERNAL ENEMY, supra note 38, at 87–89, 105–10. The presence of escaped 
slaves in the gang only strengthened the case for involving the courts, as Tucker knew first-hand 
the intransigence of the assembly on issues related to slavery.  In 1796 he had proposed an elabo-
rate plan to gradually eliminate slavery, but the plan was flatly rejected by the House of Dele-
gates. As Alan Taylor describes it, Tucker retreated into a pro-slavery position, and as Judge of 
the Court of Appeals narrowed a crucial anti-slavery decision, Wrights v. Hudgins, issued by 
Chancellor George Wythe. 
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the same in all the United States;—saving to the legislature of each 
colony or state the right of attainting individuals by an act or bill of 
attainder.”169  The behavior of “[o]ur stories,” thought Hawley, made 
this power necessary “for the general safety.”170  The distinction im-
plied that the state legislatures would be subject to a law of treason, 
applying that law to cases in the manner of courts, rather than punish-
ing individuals arbitrarily.  This view was still relatively common at the 
time, and shortly after Hawley’s letter we find it expressed in the in-
fluential treatise Hatsell’s Precedents. Hatsell described the bill of at-
tainder as “an extraordinary power,” a “deviation from the more 
ordinary forms of proceeding by indictment or impeachment” appro-
priate “where, from the magnitude of the crime, or the imminent dan-
ger to the state, it would be a greater public mischief to suffer the 
offense to pass unpunished, than even to over-step the common 
boundaries of the law.”171  Such was the case with the “most powerful 
offenders.” Jefferson, likely under Hatsell’s influence, described this 
same use for bills of attainder, observing, in a letter to Girardin, that 
Philips had been “too powerful to be arrested by the sheriff and his 
posse comitatus. . . .”172  Patrick Henry, too, had sounded this note in 
defending bills of attainder in the state constitutional convention of 
1776, expressing concern for “some towering public offender against 
whom ordinary laws would be impotent.”173 
This perspective on the bill of attainder fit quite naturally with at 
least one of the republican conceptions of the constitutional place of 
the assembly. Matters of war and peace were, by the 1760s, firmly in 
the hands of metropolitan institutions, but threats to civil government 
or the domestic police of individual colonies were regularly handled 
by governor, council and assembly.174  Maintaining security and gov-
ernment were royal obligations, and naturally discharged in individual 
colonies by assemblies, usually royally chartered bodies. When, sev-
169. Letter from Joseph Hawley to Elbridge Gerry (July 17, 1776), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CON-
STITUTION 430 (Philip P. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis added). 
170. Id. 
171. 4 JOHN  HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF  PROCEEDINGS IN THE  HOUSE OF  COMMONS 89–90 
(3d ed. 1796) (1781). 
172. Girardin Letter, supra note 8, at 336. 
173. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at 255. 
174. See JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
50–51 (2011); ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONALISM 
133–38 (1961); see also HULSEBOSCH, supra note 25, at 103–04, 347 n.146 (discussing Ethan Al-
len’s attainder and the role that provincial governments might play within the empire in ensuring 
domestic security); Steilen, supra note 2, at 832–35. 
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eral decades later, colonies began to reconstitute themselves as repub-
lican states, their assemblies continued to take on matters of police 
and justice, and Jefferson, for one, thought the assembly to be their 
proper home.175  As one commentator recently put it, Jefferson “went 
about the project of constituting a republican polity by relocating and 
transforming the power of sovereign judgment and its jurisdiction 
within constitutional structure to varied assemblies of the people.”176 
Of course, not all the institutions of the imperial constitution could be 
jettisoned. The new republican states, Jefferson thought, required a 
national body (that is, an imperial body) to support the union and 
adjudicate disputes.177  Federal institutions were thus internal to Jef-
ferson’s republicanism. Also internal were constraints imposed by law, 
given effect in a variety of institutional forms. The constraint of law 
was especially important when it came to matters of treason.  Writing 
to George Wythe in 1778, Jefferson recommended model language for 
a state treason statute that prohibited both the assembly and the 
courts of law from declaring constructive treasons.178 Treason law had 
to be given (in the words of a modern commentator) “firm defini-
tion,” even if state assemblies were to retain the power to attaint by 
bill, in order to ensure domestic security and cure failures in civil pro-
cess.179 This was, more or less, the same view Joseph Hawley had en-
dorsed: a uniform substantive law of treason, supplemented by a 
power in each assembly to attaint. 
It would take only a few decades for this view of the bill of attain-
der to weaken considerably, while at the same time a transformation 
in the constitutional role of the assembly was occurring.  Writing in 
the years around 1810, Edmund Randolph observed in his History 
that the assembly’s power to attaint derived “from some connection 
175. See generally 1 THE  PAPERS OF  THOMAS  JEFFERSON 342 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
(discussing Jefferson’s first draft of a constitution for Virginia, which provides that an adminis-
trator “shall possess the powers formerly held by king,” but excludes the prerogative powers of 
“Declaring war or peace,” “issuing letters of marque or reprisal,” and “erecting courts,” among 
others, which are “to be exercised by the legislature alone.”). 
176. Crow, supra note 120, at 168; see also BILDER, supra note 25, at 73–83 (expressing con-
cerns with equity as Crow describes, equity’s intolerance of hardship and obstruction of justice 
grew out of the royal obligations to address these sufferings, and drew on royal authority to 
address obstructions of justice, adjust procedural requirements and ignore technical failures in 
pleading. These were leading themes in equity jurisprudence, and Jefferson made note of them 
in his study of that body of law); Edward Dumbauld, Thomas Jefferson’s Equity Commonplace 
Book, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1257, 1273–80 (1991). 
177. See Leonard, supra note 124, at 372–73; PETER S. ONUF, THE MIND OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 74–75 (2007). 
178. Bill to Attaint, supra note 1, at 493–94. 
179. See  HURST, supra note 145, at 87–89. 
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with the character of grand inquest of the Commonwealth.”180  This 
was a rather traditional, legal view of the bill of attainder. The English 
House of Commons had begun to describe itself as a grand inquest in 
the 1620s to justify its role in impeachment, a process universally re-
garded as a form of judicature.181  And it was judicature in the Gen-
eral Assembly that most worried Randolph, since it posed a risk of 
“confounding . . . judicial with legislative authority.”  And yet, in the 
nearly the same breath, Randolph also suggested that the General As-
sembly’s power to attaint “may probably exist in the sphere of Virgin-
ian legislative power, as an attribute to legislation itself. . . .”182  Side-
by-side the two views of attainder made little sense.  If attainder was 
an attribute to legislation, then how did it pose a danger of con-
founding judicial and legislative powers? 
The view that a bill of attainder was a kind of legislation, as op-
posed to a summary legal procedure, gathered considerable strength 
in the last decades of the eighteenth century.  It proved attractive to 
lawyers engaged in marking out a new role for courts of law in Ameri-
can constitutional systems. We have seen already how St. George 
Tucker supported this role from a relatively early period. It is unsur-
prising, then, that in his annotations to the Commentaries he described 
the bill of attainder as “a legislative declaration of guilt.”183  They 
were arbitrary, dispensing entirely with “legal forms, legal evidence, 
and . . . every other barrier which the laws provide against tyranny and 
injustice in ordinary cases,” and thus are put to “nefarious purposes” 
in every age.184  Jefferson would later call Tucker’s account a “dia-
tribe,” but others took the same view. James Wilson’s Lectures on 
Law, written around the same time as Tucker’s annotated Commenta-
ries, described bills of attainder as “legislative verdicts.”185  Bills of 
attainder were not an expression of general will, or the reasonable 
public opinion—the proper objects of laws enacted by a popular legis-
lature—but private, factional will.186 Attainder in the assembly thus 
180. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at 269. 
181. See Plucknett, supra note 61, at 47. 
182. RANDOLPH, HISTORY, supra note 92, at 269 (emphasis added). 
183. 4 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 293. 
184. Id. at 293–94. 
185. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, Part II, Lecture VI, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 
548 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (1790). 
186. See Philip Pettit, Two Republican Traditions, in  REPUBLICAN  DEMOCRACY: LIBERTY, 
LAW AND POLITICS 169, 186–88, 199 (Andreas Niederberger & Philipp Schink eds., 2013) (dis-
cussing the depository of popular sovereignty in an assembly whose acts express the general will 
is characteristic of what Philip Pettit has called the “Franco-German tradition of republicanism,” 
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became a leading example of the legislative excesses of the 1780s, 
against which the leading Federalists complained and for which they 
prescribed judicial review as a necessary brake. In Federalist 78, Al-
exander Hamilton included the bill of attainder among the “specific 
exceptions to the legislative authority” which “can be preserved in 
practice no other way than through the medium of the courts.”187  On 
this understanding, then, bills of attainder implicated the separation of 
powers not because they confounded judicial and legislative func-
tions—they were purely legislative—but because they tested the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, upon which the efficacy of a constitutional 
ban would depend. 
In this way, Federalists were now claiming for the courts of law an 
interest in the royal authority that had been deposited in popular as-
semblies after independence.  The assembly of the 1770s had assumed 
what were, under the imperial constitution, curial or conciliar tasks: 
managing the allocation of authority throughout the dominions and 
the forms that ‘the law of the land’ would take in various institutional 
settings.188  But the conduct of the assembly, especially in matters of 
domestic police and the civil administration of justice, showed the in-
adequacy of the arrangement.  For this there were a number of reme-
dies, but principal among them was the common-law court, or, more 
precisely, the form that law took in the common-law court. Courts 
called on to play this constitutional role employed natural law with 
particularly great effect; although principles of natural law had long 
been relevant, even in English courts, they now became central to an 
emerging judicial doctrine of implied limitations on legislative 
power.189 To secure this package of institutional and doctrinal re-
forms, proponents argued that law was the proper repository of 
courts, and that the forms and processes employed by the popular as-
sembly were not, in fact, properly regarded as law at all, but instead 
arbitrary expressions of factional will.  Lost was any sense that a sov-
ereign people met in assembly was possessed of a sui generis body of 
associated in particular with Rousseau). On “public opinion” and the French Enlightenment, see 
COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN SELF-GOVERNMENT 
63–66, 79–83 (2009). 
187. THE  FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), in ALEXANDER  HAMILTON, JAMES 
MADISON, &JOHN JAY THE FEDERALIST, at 429 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
188. See generally HALLIDAY, supra note 146, at 137–76 (stating that after the Glorious 
Revolution, some of the conciliar functions related to the suspension of ordinary forms of law 
were delegated by Parliament to the King’s councils). 
189. R. H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT 142–70 (2015). 
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law suited to times of crisis and disorder. The rule of the common law 
became, in effect, the rule of law simpliciter.190 
Jefferson, always hard to pin down, moved in a somewhat differ-
ent direction, and in this respect he presaged another major institu-
tional development to come.  Jefferson had never believed in a human 
faculty of reflective reason, supposedly promoted by the form of pro-
ceedings in a court of law; for him, the reason of a people was organi-
cally connected to a particular time and place, and to a shared body of 
experiences.191  The assertion of federal jurisdiction over the law of 
nations in the 1790s evidenced, in Jefferson’s mind, how judicial pro-
ceedings could be used to partisan ends.192  The natural repository of 
the reason of a people was thus not the judiciary, but the legislature. 
If the legislature should need to be checked by another institution, the 
preferable alternative was a fully coordinate executive, whose connec-
tion to all the people would be renewed at times of crisis by their 
mobilization through political parties.193 
CONCLUSION 
The Case of Josiah Philips is a wartime case, but it is also a record 
of our efforts to construct a fundamental law of wartime. It involves 
inaccuracy, but it is not, at its heart, a case about lying. The subse-
quent history of the case well illustrates the mode of historical under-
standing that characterized the construction of fundamental law in 
eighteenth-century America. Americans sought to understand the im-
perial civil war into which they had been plunged by situating the ex-
190. Cf. Alan Cromartie, The Rule of Law, in REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION: ENGLAND 
IN THE 1650S, at 55, 57–61 (John Morrill ed., 1992) (comparing this to the posture assumed by 
common lawyers in the disputes leading up the English Civil War, who elevated the common law 
to constitutional status despite the desire for law reform and public hatred of common lawyers). 
191. See SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 90–100 (1990). 
192. See also CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 26, at 130–41, 147–52; Ralph Lerner, The 
Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 131, 152–55; Kathryn 
Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in 
the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223, 263 (1986) (noting definitions of what the ‘national 
interest’ or ‘public order’ were most frequently involved heated political controversy.”); GOE-
BEL, supra note 26, at 624 (ironically, it was Jefferson himself who apparently suggested that 
federal judges enforce the law of nations in federal criminal proceedings). 
193. Leonard, supra note 124, at 383–87 (adding that like Governor Henry, President Jeffer-
son sought ratification for his emergency actions in the legislature, and in Jefferson’s case, this 
was premised on his view of the action as extraconstitutional and ultra vires); see, e.g., Henry P. 
Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24–27 (1993). 
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perience within a familiar historical framework.194  That framework 
was largely defined by a common law triumphant over arbitrary gov-
ernment.195 The bill of attainder rested on a long tradition, but it 
never held a firm position in this framework.196 This did not make it 
any easier to describe a satisfactory alternative regime. Americans 
knew meanings for “legislative” and “executive,” but disagreed about 
their content, and struggled to connect these ideas to familiar English 
institutions in a way that accomplished the concrete tasks of govern-
ment at war. They carried on their deliberations about how best to 
design institutions in a period that only recently had seen the rise of 
legislative reporting, which remained unreliable and even fictive in its 
methods.197 And their arguments evolved rapidly, as changing condi-
tions altered the terms of constitutional persuasion. If we cannot 
square the corners of the Case of Josiah Philips, then, we should not 
be surprised; but that does not mean it has nothing to tell us. 
194. See COLBOURN, supra note 58, at 21–56; MCCONVILLE, supra note 21, at 266–74; John 
Phillip Reid, The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography 
of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY 147, 149, 156–58, 181–87 
(Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993). 
195. MCCONVILLE, supra note 21, at 274. 
196. Steilen, supra note 2, at 772–73. 
197. BILDER, supra note 78, at 19–34. 
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